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 Despite the increases in global wealth attributable to globalization and increased 
international trade, the damage done by socially irresponsible production practices 
remains an area of concern for international human and labor rights advocates.  Because 
international trade law under the World Trade Organization (WTO) imposes strict 
limitations on the policy options available to Member States, international human rights 
and international trade have been viewed as fundamentally at odds with one another.  
This Article argues that market-based incentives can be used to allow international trade 
to reinforce established human rights principles, rather than constantly undermining 
government attempts to formulate appropriate policy solutions. 
 This Article proposes that the United States create and implement a voluntary, 
government-run system of human rights label.  Like the content positive labels currently 
offered for organic products, this human rights labeling system would provide consumers 
with additional information in order to reward producers who had met certain standards.   
Unlike the current system that allows producers to place whatever “human rights” labels 
that they want on their products and allows numerous third-party certification schemes, a 
government-run system could serve to create one label that consumers will recognize as 
credible, consistent, and enforceable.   
 Most importantly, the labeling system proposed by this Article does not run afoul 
of the United States’s commitments under the WTO.  The two relevant agreements, the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), are examined in depth for any possible conflicts.  The 
Article concludes that because of the voluntary nature of the label, the proposed labeling 
scheme should be able to survive scrutiny by a WTO dispute settlement panel, if it such a 
challenge were to arise.  Further, the Article argues that the label could be justified as a 
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In a local grocery store in middle-America, a chocolate-loving consumer contemplates 
two substantially identical candy bars.  The hungry shopper has no particular brand 
loyalty, and both sweets are of a comparable price.  Before proceeding to the checkout 
line, the consumer spots a seal on the wrapper of one of the candy bars, indicating that 
the chocolate has been certified by the United States government for being produced in a 
socially responsible manner. This seal, if credible and easily recognizable, has added a 
new dimension to the consumer’s choice by allowing her to make a decision based on 
information that goes beyond nutrition, ingredients, taste or any other properties 
associated with the candy bar itself.  Instead, the consumer is empowered to make a 
choice based on how the candy bar was produced.  As a consequence of this information, 
the consumer can elect to use her buying power to effectively cast a vote in favor of 
socially responsible production by giving the certified chocolate a competitive edge.1 
 
On the other side of the globe, in West Africa, a child works long hours harvesting cocoa 
beans, one of an estimated 12,000 children trafficked for this purpose in Cote d’Ivoire 
alone.2  Approximately 40% of world cocoa production originates in Cote d’Ivoire, where 
the pressure to keep production prices as low as possible stems from the easy 
substitutability and high competition in the market for this agricultural good.3  Stories of 
children being trafficked to work in “horrific” conditions in the West African cocoa fields 
were brought to the public’s attention in 2000, yet consumers in the United States are still 
unwittingly buying chocolate produced by trafficked children.  Pressure from the public 
and from Congress shamed the chocolate industry into agreeing to a comprehensive 
protocol4 aimed at creating a certification process for a “no child slavery” label, but 
stalled negotiations have left chocolate unlabeled and consumers uninformed.5  Further, 
consumers are forced to rely on the representations of the industry rather than knowing 
                                                 
1 The use of the term “vote” to describe consumer choice in favor of goods produced in a 
particular way was coined by Douglas Kysar.  Doug Kysar, Preferences for Processes: 
The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 525, 527 (2004). 
2 Tiaji Salaam-Blyther et. al, Child Labor in West African Cocoa Production: Issues and 
U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, 9, July 13, 2005. 
3 Id. at 2. 
4 The text of the Harkin-Engel Protocol is available at 
http://www.cocoainitiative.org/images/stories/pdf/harkin%20engel%20protocol.pdf. 
5 For more information on where the chocolate industry has fallen short in this regard, see 
Brian Campbell & Bama Athreya,  October 2006 – Report on Cocoa and Forced Child 
Labor, International Labor Rights Forum, available at http://www.laborrights.org/stop-
child-labor/cocoa-campaign/resources/425. 
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that a credible and enforceable framework is in place to ensure the reliability of socially 
responsible product labels. 
 
The United States has pursued a number of trade-related measures to tackle human rights 
concerns globally, but human rights activists have often overlooked state–run, market-
based policies. Many states are unable to pursue human rights policies that might limit 
market access because of the commitments they have made to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).6  As a consequence, there have been relatively few formal 
government programs linking trade and human rights.  At the same time, because trade 
commitments are often seen as conflicting with human rights concerns, the international 
trade regime has come to be viewed by many social reformers as the enemy.7   
 
This paper argues that trade and human rights can reinforce one another rather than 
engage in a zero sum game.  It is possible to use the power of consumer choice to achieve 
human rights goals within the confines set by the international trade regime.  Although 
some private organizations have attempted to harness the power of consumer choice 
through social labeling programs, a more coherent and consistent approach to social 
labeling—one not simply tolerated by national governments, but sponsored by them—is 
required to expand on the early success of labeling. As this paper will show, states have 
the ability to take measures that do not directly restrict the flow of trade and allow 
consumers to express their preferences for products that are produced in a socially 
responsible manner.  
 
Putting responsibility in the hands of consumers allows the market to respond and allows 
states to avoid taking direct action that restricts trade, while still making progress towards 
accomplishing non-commercial goals.  For labeling to be successful, consumers need to 
be provided with reliable and recognizable information that allows them to make 
purchasing choices that will appropriately reflect preferences for products that are 
produced in conditions that do not exploit the people producing them.  From a basic 
economic standpoint, it would be difficult for a WTO panel to agree that it is best to 
perpetuate a market failure based on imperfect information, as the entire premise of the 
international trade regime is to let the market dictate.  The sheer size and strength of the 
market for consumer goods in the United States puts the government in the unique 
position of providing a small amount of information and then allowing this market to 
respond in a manner that will have an impact world-wide. 
 
                                                 
6 For a general description of the World Trade Organization and the multilateral 
agreements included under its auspices, see World Trade Organization mainpage, 
available at www.wto.org. 
7 For example, the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle 1999 was hampered by street-
protests, where many of the protestors identified themselves as pro-Labor, anti-Capitalist, 
anarchists, or environmentalists.  See Paul de Armond, Netwar in the Emerald City: WTO 
Protest Strategy and Tactics, in NETWORKS AND NETWARS: THE FUTURE OF TERROR, 
CRIME, AND MILITANCY (John Arquilla & David F. Ronfeldt eds., 2001). 
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The federal government should take a more active stance by creating and administering 
an appropriate system of labels that takes the human rights costs of product production 
into account, and that this type of labeling is not a violation the United States’ 
commitments under the WTO.  I put forward a new proposal for a voluntary, 
government-run system of human rights labels8 that provides several practical and 
normative advantages over the current mishmash of private labels on the market and to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of this proposal using existing WTO jurisprudence.9  
This approach is an essential step forward in the struggle to make progress towards 
addressing pervasive social problems while working within the constraints that are 
necessary for a predictable and robust trade regime.  
 
This article will proceed by first taking stock of the tensions between the international 
trade and human rights systems and demonstrating that they are not inherently at odds.  
As Part II demonstrates, the lack of integration between these regimes necessitates 
creative solutions that allow human rights concerns to be appropriately valued while 
avoiding the pitfall of creating further barriers to trade, highlighting the need for a 
solution such as the proposed labeling scheme to allow these regimes to reinforce one 
another.  To illustrate the contours of how labeling works and its successes, Part III offers 
a brief sketch of labels historically and takes stock of the current “labeling landscape.”  
The history of labeling offers a jumping-off point for this article’s outline of what a 
                                                 
8 For the purposes of this paper, the term “human rights” is being used in its broadest 
sense to encompass everything from human trafficking, to labor rights, to social and 
political rights.  Because this paper does not intend to define the contours of what rights 
should be reflected in labels, the term human rights is used as a synonym for “socially 
responsible,” but is distinguished from those labels that are intended to protect the 
environment or the consumer. 
9 In light of the two aforementioned goals, this paper does not intend to answer all of the 
larger administrative questions about how such a labeling scheme should be developed, 
what its focus should be, and what criteria the labels should be based on, but rather leaves 
such determinations to the appropriate stakeholders through the agency regulatory 
process.  Further, this paper does not seek to identify the industries and products that are 
most likely to be responsive to a labeling scheme of this type, as such determinations are 
best left to the economists and industry specialists, and it does not engage in the larger 
debate on whether or not practices such as “sweatshops” are ultimately a net positive or 
negative for the people laboring in such conditions. For more information on the debate 
surrounding labor conditions in the developing world and whether or not eliminating 
practices like sweatshops is beneficial or detrimental to developing country workers, see 
Nicolas Kristof & Sheryl WuDunn, Two Cheers for Sweatshops, in BEYOND INTEGRITY: 
A JUDEO-CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (Scott B. Rae & Kenman L. Wong, 
eds. 2004), 239; Denis Gordon Arnold & Laura Pincus Hartman, Worker Rights and Low 
Wage Industrialization: How to Avoid Sweatshops, 28 HUMAN RTS. Q. 676 (2006); Peter 
Dorman, International Labor Standards: The Economic Context, 11 MSU-DCL J. INT'L 
L. 125 (2002).  However, the paper does advocate targeting responsive products and 
focusing on the most egregious abuses associated with production as a starting point. 
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government-sponsored labeling scheme should look like and what its primary goals 
should be.  Although the picture offered is far from complete, given the necessity of 
allowing the political process to articulate the appropriate balances between opposing 
interests, the basic idea is evaluated from a normative perspective and shown to be 
superior to the labeling options currently on the market. 
 
After offering the basic proposal and reasons behind it, the bulk of this article is 
dedicated to a comprehensive legal analysis of a voluntary, government-run social 
labeling scheme under the international trade regime.   If the labeling scheme were 
scrutinized by a WTO dispute settlement panel, Part IV explains how the labels would be 
evaluated for compliance with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement) and/or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Part V takes 
stock of the legal tests articulated by WTO panels and the Appellate Body and applies 
these tests to the case of voluntary government labels, ultimately concluding that a panel 
would be unlikely to find a violation.  Further, the United States would also have the 
option of raising the equivalent of “affirmative defenses” by invoking the exceptions 
clause of the GATT found in Article XX. Article XX offers additional justification for 
the proposed labeling scheme, in the unlikely event that an initial violation had been 
found.  This legal analysis demonstrates that there are several strong arguments for 
exempting this type of labeling scheme. Part IV also highlights the trade law provisions 
under which the scheme is the most vulnerable but ultimately concludes that the proposed 
labeling scheme is likely to survive even the best-reasoned challenge at the WTO. 
 
The paper concludes by recognizing some of the major obstacles and criticisms that a 
government-instituted labeling scheme geared towards human rights would face and 
offering ways in which the scheme can avoid potential pitfalls.  While it is inevitable that 
difficulties will be encountered in the implementation of labeling regulations and it is 
difficult to predict how successful a label will be, the value derived from allowing 
consumer access to credible information far outweighs the inconvenience of developing 
an appropriate and responsive certification system.  Significantly, this paper offers a way 
to bridge the divide between two growing areas of international law in a way that is both 
logical and legal. 
II:  Dealing with the conflict between trade and human rights 
 
One of the most significant challenges facing the international community is maintaining 
a fair and predictable international trade regime, while at the same time making progress 
on addressing global social ills. Throughout history, states have resorted to carrots and 
sticks of an economic nature to encourage cooperation and to coerce one another into 
behaving in a certain way.10 Customary international law does not prohibit a state from 
utilizing international trade mechanisms to encourage or coerce compliance with human 
                                                 
10 See generally, David Montgomery, Labor Rights and Human Rights: A Historical 
Perspective, in Environment, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 13-21 (1996) 
(tracing the international aspects of the labor rights movement in the United States). 
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rights norms.11  Thus, a linkage between human rights and trade seems intuitive and 
perhaps necessary to achieve progress on human rights goals because of the lack of 
effective enforcement mechanisms within international human rights treaties.   
Historically, states have used a variety of strategies to encourage adherence to human 
rights norms, both unilaterally and under the auspices of international and regional 
organizations.12  However, the strict rules associated with membership in the WTO have 
limited states’ ability to take action that impedes international trade, even to encourage 
progress on internationally recognized human rights issues.13 
A. Trade and Human Rights: Inherently at Odds? 
 
Both the modern multilateral trade regime and the international human rights movement 
are a product of post-World War II phenomenon.14  Both regimes limit the policy options 
available to governments—the trade regime by clearly articulating a set of global trade 
                                                 
11 Id. at 208-61. 
12 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and the WTO, in ENVIRONMENT, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 200-01 (discussing the variety of 
mechanisms available to states to fill the hole left by the absence of effective 
international remedies for human rights violations). 
13 For example, the GATT prohibits discrimination against any Member State and does 
not allow a state to take action to discriminate against imported products relative to 
domestic products.  If a WTO member enacted an embargo against a particular product 
from another Member State because it wanted to punish the other member for perceived 
human rights violations, this would be a violation of the WTO rules.  States that are 
found to be in violation of a WTO agreement by the WTO’s dispute settlement body are 
subject to countermeasures.  See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, Art. 22, 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 
I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
14 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy, 
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development: Rights and 
Democracy, 4 (2000).  
The WTO grew out of the GATT.  The original twenty-three parties to the 
General Agreement intended to draft a charter for an International Trade Organization 
(ITO), which would be a specialized agency of the United Nations to coordinate 
international rules on trade, employment, commodities, restrictive business practices, 
international investment, and trade in services. However, this proposal failed, leaving the 
GATT with “virtually no institutional framework,” and leaving the international 
community without agreements in the associated areas listed above and without 
mechanisms to deal with related issues such as labor rights and environmental 
degradation. The GATT was modernized through voluntary membership and subsequent 
agreements through a series of trade rounds The Roots of the WTO, Economics at Iowa 
State University, available at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ355/choi/wtoroots.htm, last visited 21 Jan 2008.   
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rules and the international human rights regime by limiting government’s actions with 
regard to individuals.15  However, because these regimes have developed along parallel, 
but not necessarily “consistent” paths, there are points of considerable tension. 
Globalization has created new opportunities for human rights abuses to occur. Concerns 
about the “race to the bottom” have permeated discussions of globalization, as the 
pressure to keep production prices low has impacted producers’ willingness to expend 
more resources by providing adequate protections for their workers.  Even conceptually, 
it is clear that a choice must be made between promoting completely free trade that 
affords all like products16 the same treatment regardless of how they are produced, and 
using trade to improve the human rights situations of workers on the ground.  At the same 
time, increasing trade may inherently enhance human rights by improving human welfare 
and stimulating a stronger middle-class that will demand political freedoms.17  
 
In addition to requiring adherence to trade agreements, the WTO offers a binding 
settlement body to adjudicate trade disputes.  Dispute settlement panels and the WTO’s 
Appellate Body have refused to stray far from the exact letter of the WTO treaties, and 
have thus struck down measures intended to address other social ills as being inconsistent 
with trade rules.18  Because the WTO dispute settlement opens the potential for 
countermeasures against states that lose in trade disputes, many policies intended to 
improve areas such as human rights or environmental conservation have been abandoned 
to avoid economic retaliation sanctioned by the WTO. This is especially true for States 
with smaller economies that are more likely to be damaged irreparably by 
countermeasures, but even the United States has been ruled against several times in the 
WTO.19 The combination of a forum to negotiate trade concerns and the enforceability of 
                                                 
15 Caroline Dommen, Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization: 
Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies, 24 HUMAN RTS QTLY 1, 4 (2004) [hereinafter 
Dommen, Raising]. 
16 The definition of “like product” within the meaning of Articles I:1 and III:4 of the 
GATT will be analyzed in Part IV(C)(1) and (2). 
17 SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON & JAMIE M. ZIMMERMAN, TRADE IMBALANCE: THE 
STRUGGLE TO WEIGH HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN TRADE POLICYMAKING, 6 (2008) 
(arguing that trade stimulates “an export-oriented middle class, which will use its 
increasing economic clout to demand political freedoms and to press for openness and 
good governance). 
18 See e.g., United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) 
(unadopted) (Aug. 16, 1991) [hereinafter U.S.—Tuna I]; Panel Report, United States – 
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) (unadopted) (June 
1994) [hereinafter U.S.—Tuna II]; United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 21 (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.—
Gasoline]; Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) [hereinafter U.S.—Shrimp I]. 
19 See e.g., U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 18; U.S.—Shrimp I, supra note 18; Report of the 
Appellate Body, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 
2005); Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439 -
36S/345(Jan 16, 1989) (adopted Nov. 7, 1989) [hereinafter U.S.—Section 337]; Report of 
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dispute settlement decisions has contributed to the perception that trade is often elevated 
above human rights concerns.20 Numerous other tensions between the two regimes have 
been identified by scholars, ranging from their different fundamental aims to asymmetry 
between the rights and obligations of countries and corporations.21  Because dispute 
settlement is costly and attracts international attention, states often want to avoid it, 
chilling the formation and implementation of policies that may otherwise benefit 
international human rights.  
 
Because the WTO system has significantly limited the space that states have to link non-
commercial considerations to trade, the international trade and international human rights 
regimes have developed in isolation in many ways.22  Given the strong incentive offered 
by international trade and the important deterrent that trade barriers have traditionally 
provided, human rights activists have found themselves frustrated at the inability of states 
to use trade to pressure other states into improving human rights conditions.23  Further, 
such advocates of linking the two regimes have argued that the current state of 
international trade law actually inhibits national policymakers’ ability to live up to their 
commitments under international human rights law, as they are unable to take any 
measures that may serve as a barrier to trade.24 Given this tension, countries often behave 
differently from one another when faced with decisions at the intersection between the 
two.  Because of the existence of trade-offs, there is an inherent balancing act and a series 
of value judgments that states are forced to make.  The explicit limitations offered by 
each regime complicate what would otherwise be a decision within the sovereignty of a 
particular state. 
 
Although the GATT/WTO developed in relative isolation institutionally because the 
GATT had no associated international organization until the advent of the WTO, the text 
of Article XX demonstrates that the drafters recognized the interplay between non-trade 
public values such as human rights and international trade and made allowances for them 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Appellate Body, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S.—
Gambling].  See generally, Roman Grynberg & Jan Ives Remy, Small Vulnerable 
Economy Issues and the WTO, in WTO AT THE MARGINS: SMALL STATES AND THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM, 281-93 (discussing the particular difficulties that 
small economies face within the WTO system). 
20 AARONSON, supra note 17, at 3 (2008). 
21 For a larger discussion and a graphical layout of these perceived incompatibilities, see 
Dommen, Raising, supra note 15, at 14-15. 
22 For a table listing the perceived incompatibilities between international human rights 
and trade law, see id. 
23 Caroline Dommen, Safeguarding the Legitimacy of the Multilateral Trading System: 
The Role of Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, EDS 
ABBOTT ET AL. (2006), at 125 [hereinafter Dommen, Safeguarding]. 
24 See Salman Bal, International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: 
Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT, MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 62, 63 (2001). 
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within the text itself.25  Article XX allows for general exceptions to the rules found in the 
rest of the agreement for reasons such as “public morals” or to protect human life or 
health.26 Further, the Agreement Establishing the WTO lists lofty goals beyond simply 
eliminating barriers to trade, such as encouraging sustainable development and increasing 
developing countries’ access to the benefits from increased trade.27 Article 103 of the 
United Nations Charter also makes the obligations of Member States to the Charter 
superior to their obligations under other international agreements, thus some 
commentators have argued that a commitment to a universally recognized right should 
prevail over the GATT or other WTO agreements in the event of a conflict.28 
 
Despite the perception that human rights and trade are at odds, states have found a few 
ways to link the two regimes in a logical way.  For example, Congress has found some 
limited flexibility within international trade agreements to fight human rights and labor 
rights abuses by conditioning eligibility for preferential market access under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) on commitments from states to eliminate the 
worst forms of child labor and including labor rights components in its free trade 
agreements.29  Although scholars have proposed a variety of measures intended to 
                                                 
25 Howse, supra note 14, at 7.  
26  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), Art. XX, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT].  
27 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE 
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), preamble, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) 
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
28 Howse, supra note 14, at 9; U.N. Charter art. 103. 
29 For a more comprehensive list of mechanisms Congress has used to combat child 
labor, see CHILD LABOR IN WEST AFRICAN COCOA PRODUCTION: ISSUES AND U.S. POLICy, 
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RL32990 (July 13, 2005). 
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increase interaction between trade and human rights,30 the WTO still poses a significant 
bar to more actively using trade to enforce human rights norms.31   
 
B. Labels as a way to resolve this tension and incentivize progress 
on human rights goals 
 
This article proposes a new and innovative way for the United States government to take 
advantage of its market power to encourage compliance with internationally recognized 
human rights norms.  The government is able to play an active role and determine what 
social goals it would like to prioritize, while avoiding conflict with any WTO rules. The 
labeling scheme proposed allows governments to be directly involved in decisions 
regarding what types of conduct on behalf of producers selling on their markets should be 
rewarded and what conduct should be discouraged.  As setting human rights priorities is 
largely a political decision, governments have an essential role to play in determining 
how labeling criteria should be developed and ultimately where lines should be drawn.  
These labels are also useful because they operate in the gray area where exploitative 
conduct taken by private sector actors is not directly beholden to international human 
rights law, since only state action is subject to the international human rights treaties.32 
 
Labels offer an important way to allow trade to reinforce human rights norms, rather than 
undermine them.  These “human rights labels” would be modeled on the success of “eco-
labels” used by the environmental movement to promote products that have been 
                                                 
30 See e.g., Daniel S. Ehrenberg, From Intention to Action An ILO-GAA Enforcement 
Regime for International Labor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, EDS. LANCE A. COMPRA & STEPHEN F. DIAMOND (1996) (arguing 
for a combination of the ILO and WTO with a single enforcement mechanism); Susan 
Ariel Aaronson, A Match Made in the Corporate and Public Interest: Marrying 
Voluntary CSR Initiatives and the WTO, 41(3) J. OF WORLD TRADE 629 (2007) 
(promoting increased linkages of voluntary corporate social responsibility and the WTO); 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations “Global Compact for Integrating 
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European 
Integration, 13 EIJL 621 (2002) (arguing for the enforcement of human rights through 
the WTO). 
31 See generally FRANCESCO FRANCIONI, ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS 
OF FREE TRADE, 1-9 (2001) (identifying the sources of discontent with the WTO and the 
resulting questions about the legitimacy of the WTO decision-making process). 
32 Most human rights treaties protect the rights of individuals against state action, since 
states agree to be bound by these conventions.  A variety of approaches have been taken 
to hold the extraterritorial abuses of multi-national corporations liable under United 
States law, such as using indirect liability under the Alien Torts Claims Act.  28 U.S.C. 
§1350.  For examples of cases in which this has been argued, see Doe v. Unocal Corp., 
963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp.2d 
1229, 1234 (N.D. Cal. 2004); In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp.2d 
538, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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produced in a manner that is environmentally friendly.  Like eco-labels, the impact of the 
proposed labels is market-based rather than “command and control,” where governments 
set exact regulations that products must meet in order to be sold. This makes a scheme 
less of a barrier to international trade because the government allows all products equal 
market access, regardless of how they are produced. As long as the labeling scheme is 
based as much as possible on internationally recognized human rights norms, it would not 
only be a difficult legal battle for a WTO member state to challenge the labels, but it 
would also be an incredibly unpopular political move.  If successful, human rights labels 
could create a “win-win” situation for the United States government. 
 
III. Voluntary human rights labels: a proposal for government 
involvement  
 
In order to accomplish the goal of creating market-based incentives for improving human 
rights practices during production, it is important to take stock of the existing world of 
labels.  Labels are not a new phenomenon by any means, and there is value in considering 
the successes and failures of existing labeling schemes.  Further, the government should 
develop human rights labels with a clear set of objectives in mind because of the difficult 
political realities associated with the substantive criteria for certification.  Section A of 
this Part will identify three types of labeling schemes and highlight important features 
and examples of each.  This Section articulates the reasons why a voluntary scheme is the 
most appropriate in the human rights context.  Section B will further articulate the 
underlying goals of such a scheme and how the voluntary label is likely to meet them.  
This paper contributes to the literature through both its proposal of a type of labeling 
scheme that has never existed in the United States and by articulating the relative 
advantages associated with such as scheme on a broad, normative level. 
 
A. Three categories of labeling schemes: an evaluation of relative 
strengths and weaknesses 
 
There are three possible types of labels that can be employed to signal information about 
the broader effects of a product to the consumer: mandatory labeling schemes, voluntary 
labeling schemes, and private labeling schemes.33  There are notable examples of each 
type of label, and each has different strengths and weaknesses.  For the purposes of 
human rights labeling, this paper will advocate on behalf of the second option as the best 
fit. 
 
i. Mandatory labels: in the WTO danger-zone and impracticable 
 
                                                 
33 Manoj Joshi, Are Eco-Labels Consistent with World Trade Organization Agreements?, 
38(1) J. OF WORLD TRADE, 69, 73 (2004).  Note that the first two types of schemes are 
government-run and the third is implemented by private actors. 
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A mandatory labeling scheme requires that all producers provide certain standard 
information about their product on the packaging. Mandatory labels are effective at 
communicating information, as all similar products are required to have the same 
information to allow consumers to directly compare products to one another.34  For 
example, the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 requires that food products 
for human consumption in the United States be labeled with a list of ingredients and a 
general nutrition label.35   
 
In some cases, mandatory labeling schemes have been associated with an embargo—if 
the product at issue did not qualify for certification under a particular standard, it could 
not be sold in the certifying country’s markets.36  Only these types of mandatory schemes 
have thus far been challenged in front of GATT and WTO panels, as they clearly contain 
direct restrictions on trade.  
 
It is impossible to know how a mandatory label based on production information without 
an associated embargo would fare in front of a WTO panel.  In the context of human 
rights labeling, it seems that a mandatory label would become a de facto barrier to trade 
for all producers who were unable or unwilling to provide the necessary information 
about the human costs of their production process to the U.S. government.  The 
mandatory nature of the label would exclude products that did not provide this 
information from the market, giving rise to a much stronger claim of an infringement 
under WTO rules than the voluntary scheme being proposed by this paper.  It is entirely 
possible that some producers are simply unable to provide enough information on their 
production processes because of complicated supply chains that span international 
borders.37  Thus, a mandatory label not only runs the risk of being struck down by a 
WTO panel, but it also is likely to prove impracticable. 
 
                                                 
34 Steve Keane, Can a Consumer’s Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The Case of Food 
Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 297 (2006). 
35 21 U.S.C. § 343.  For more discussion see Keane, supra note 34, at 297-99. 
36 The labeling schemes that GATT/WTO panels have ruled against have all been this 
type of scheme.  For example, the United States was ruled against four times for refusing 
to allow the sale of tuna fished with purse seine nets or the sale of shrimp that had been 
caught without the use of turtle excluder devices.  U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 18; U.S.—
Tuna II, supra note 18; U.S.—Shrimp I, supra note 18; Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001).  However, France was 
allowed to exclude products containing asbestos from its market under this type of 
mandatory scheme based on an Article XX exception. Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC—Asbestos]. 
37 Onno Kuik, Note and Comment, Fair Trade and Ethical Labeling in the Clothing, 
Textile, and Footwear Sector: The Case of Blue Jeans, 11 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 619, 
623 (2005) (articulating the difficulties associated with labeling in the textile market 
because of issues such as complicated supply chains). 
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ii. Private Labels: legal but lacking consistency and 
enforcement 
 
Because the U.S. Government has not instituted any type of labeling scheme in the realm 
of human or labor rights, a number of private and industry-driven standards have arisen 
to provide consumers with production method information. The private sector has created 
voluntary codes of conduct and social labeling schemes to promote responsible business 
practices both domestically and abroad.38  Many of these types of labels are familiar to 
consumers who purchase “fair trade” coffee or “sweat shop-free” apparel.  However, it is 
often difficult for a consumer to tell whether or not these representations are the result of 
an independent evaluation or are simply a claim the manufacturer is making unilaterally. 
The sheer number of such labels adds to the confusion, and there is no clear definition for 
what constitutes “fair trade” or “sweat shop-free.”   
 
Despite the inherent lack of legitimacy associated with private labeling, more than one 
hundred companies—mainly those that produce consumer goods—have adopted social 
codes with associated labels.39  This indicates that there is consumer demand for products 
that are produced in a socially responsible way, and that producers recognize this need 
and are willing to make adjustments in this production practices and in the transparency 
of such production practices in order to provide consumers with the assurances necessary 
to meet this need.  This is not a recent phenomenon—reformers have used labeling to 
mobilize public support for responsible business practices since the late 19th century with 
the “White Label Campaign” which was a predecessor of today’s no-sweat labeling 
schemes.40  Further, companies such as “No Sweat Apparel” have been founded solely to 
meet the demand for socially responsible products and market only products made under 
“fair trade” conditions.41 
 
Public opinion has played a major role in driving the demand for social labels and 
spurring corporations to take action to improve their human rights records.  Both Nike 
and Wal-mart’s Kathy Lee Gifford clothing line faced a media storm after exploitative 
labor conditions were discovered at their overseas production centers.42  As a result, 
companies that produce consumer goods that are particularly vulnerable to consumer 
                                                 
38 Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Torts Claims Act, 76 TEX. L. 
REV 1533, 1551 (1998) (reviewing HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE, LANCE A. COMPRA & STEPHEN F. DIAMOND eds (1996)). 
39 Cleveland, supra note 12. 
40 Michele Micheletti & Dietlind Stolle, The Politics of Consumption/The Consumption of 
Politics: Mobilizing Consumers to Take Responsibility for Global Social Justice, 611 
ANNALS 157, 162 (2007). 




choice and public exposure of inappropriate labor conditions have taken action to avoid 
such negative attention.43   
 
However, not all corporate codes are created equal, and some have come under fire as 
being “self-serving” and having ineffectual internal monitoring.44  Others, such as Levi-
Strauss, have developed praise-worthy initiatives that have elaborate structures for 
“auditing, evaluating, and enforcing its code terms” and have demonstrated that they are 
willing to eliminate contracts with suppliers who are not meeting the stated expectations 
and to force reforms in less serious cases.45  In the absence of government guidelines for 
human rights labeling, both Nike and Levi-Strauss can put a similar “made in socially 
responsible conditions” label on their product, even though it seems relatively clear that 
Levi-Strauss is holding its suppliers to far more rigorous standards.  This inequality 
creates an incentive for deception as companies seek to maintain a positive public image 
while continuing to compete to keep production prices low.46 
 
Action is being taken at an industry-wide level as well, often with the support and 
encouragement of the U.S. government.  For example, in 1996, President Clinton helped 
establish the Apparel Industry Partnership—a group composed of industry 
representatives, unions, and groups dedicated to labor advocacy— for clothing and 
footwear industries in which sweatshop conditions were garnering a significant amount 
of public attention.47  Congress has also taken a stance to force the chocolate industry to 
make progress on the problem of child labor through developing an appropriate label.48  
However, the failure of stakeholders to meet the 2005 deadline for public certification 
standards demonstrates the problem that many private schemes face as stakeholders on 
opposite sides of the debate deadlock and are unable to reach a mutually acceptable 
solution.49 
 
                                                 
43 Companies such as Levi-Strauss, Reebok, Gap, Nike, Sears, JC Penney, Wal-Mart, 
Home Depot, and Philips Can-Heusen are among the producers than have adopted such 
codes.  Micheletti, supra note 40, at 162. 
44 Nike is a notable target of such accusations.  Id. 
45 Id. 
46 It is noteworthy that false representations by manufacturers may be actionable under 
state law, giving individuals the ability to bring private attorney general actions against 
patently false public relations campaigns.  Kasky v. Nike, Inc. 27 Cal.4th 939, 45 P.3d 
243 (2002).  This could serve to strengthen private labeling schemes and increase their 
credibility with consumers by offering litigation as a deterrent.  However, this will do 
little to level the playing field between codes with lower standards and those that have 
more exacting requirements. 
47 Id. at 1552. 
48 Harkin-Engel Protocol, supra note 4. 
49 See Harkin, Engel, Congressional Leaders, Work to Eliminate Child Labor in Cocoa 
Industry (Oct 30, 2007), Webpage of Tom Harkin, available at 
http://harkin.senate.gov/pr/p.cfm?i=286485. 
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The above examples demonstrate the that United States government is willing to get 
involved to encourage and facilitate negotiations between stakeholders with the expected 
outcome of developing industry-wide standards that will result in consumer labels.  It is 
not a far leap to imagine the government moving from the position of facilitator/instigator 
of the negotiations and into the role of being the ultimate decision maker after receiving 
input from all of the stakeholders.  Because it is ultimately a political decision, it seems 
as though the government may be the most appropriate entity to unlock the types of 
deadlocks that have handicapped the Harkin-Engel negotiations. 
 
iii. Voluntary labels: striking the appropriate balance 
 
Although Section B will fully articulate the labeling scheme proposed by this paper, the 
category of voluntary labels offers several advantages in the human rights context as a 
general matter.  The knockdown argument for voluntary labels over mandatory labels is 
simply their legality, which will be explored in Part IV.  Even from a practical standpoint, 
allowing producers to choose whether or not to seek certification for their production 
methods provides an incentive for companies to both produce in a socially responsible 
manner and to provide appropriate documentation, such that producers who cannot 
document simply do not get a label but are not otherwise penalized.  Compared to a 
mandatory scheme, a voluntary scheme is less trade restrictive because unlabeled 
products are still eligible for commercial sale without restriction. 
 
Currently, successful government-instituted voluntary labeling schemes exist in the 
environmental context in several Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries.  Germany issued its first environmental label in 1978, 
and by the early 1990s its “Blue Angel” program consisted of over 3,600 labeled 
products.50  Today, more than twenty OECD countries have products with environmental 
labels distributed for purchase in their domestic territory.51  Although there has been a 
significant amount of debate within the WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment 
(CTE),52 no challenge has been brought before the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism 
over a voluntary labeling scheme.53  Considering how widespread such labels are, it 
would be difficult to isolate a challenge against only one Member State’s program, and 
the lack of such a challenge seems to indicate that states are unwilling to litigate this 
matter and would prefer to debate and negotiate. 
 
                                                 
50 JAMES SALZMAN, TECHNOLOGY & ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME: OECD, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, 13 (1991). 
51 Id. 
52 See Marianne Jönsson, Discussions in the Committee for Trade and Environment: Eco-
labeling and the TBT Agreement, Kommerskollegium National Board of Trade, 
Appendix 1 (Mar. 3, 2002). 
53 The U.S.—Tuna I case involved a challenge to a voluntary label, but this came before a 
GATT panel that was never adopted by the membership.  U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 18. 
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The United States government has also elected to voluntary labeling schemes for eco-
labeling purposes.  Both the Energy Star program54 and the “dolphin-safe” tuna label55 
are well known examples of this type of label.  Both have been extremely successful, 
with non-dolphin safe tuna being almost eliminated from the market and with the Energy 
Star program estimated to have prevented 13 million metric tons of carbon from being 
released as well as cumulative energy bill savings estimated between $40 billion and $57 
billion.56  Another important example of a voluntary label that is based on product 
production methods is the labeling of organic products under the Organic Foods 
Protection Act of 1990,57 under which sales have grown between 15 and 21% annually.58 
 
Along with the legitimacy that the government brings along with it because of the 
democratic process, government involvement lends further credibility to a label through 
its police power.  Because the government awards voluntary labels, it is free to punish 
misrepresentations and imitation labels.  For example, misuse of the organic label can 
result in a fine of up to $10,000,59 and the DPCIA provides for up to $100,000 in civil 
penalties.60 
 
Voluntary labels strike the appropriate balance necessary for human rights labeling by 
improving the legitimacy, clarity, and credibility of the certification process by setting the 
government in the roll of an independent evaluator and publisher of the certification 
criteria.  Further, the voluntary nature of the scheme allows the government to avoid 
directly interfering in international trade, thus keeping the scheme legal.  This balance of 
effectiveness and legality is essential for the success of a human rights labeling program. 
 
 B. Recognizing the core goals and basic strategies 
  
The intended contribution of this paper is to advocate on behalf of a particular category 
of labels—voluntary government-run human rights labels—that have never been used in 
                                                 
54 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy run 
the Energy Star program as a voluntary labeling program designed to identify and 
promote energy-efficient products to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Energy Star, 
About Energy Star, http://www.energystar.gov.  For a description of the Energy Star 
Program and the estimated savings attributed to it, see C.A. Webber, R.E. Brown and J. 
Koomey, Savings Estimates for the Energy Star Voluntary Labeling Program, SCIENCE 
DIRECT (1999), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/. 
55 This label is mandated by the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA), 
16 U.S.C. § 1385. 
56 Id. 
57 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6523. 
58 A. Bryan Endres, An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics Industry: Coming to 
Terms with Big Organics and Other Legal Challenges for the Industry’s Next Ten Years, 
12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L 17, 18 (2007). 
59 7 U.S.C. § 6519(a). 
60 16 U.S.C. § 1385(e). 
18 
the United States61 and to defend the legality of this proposal under the WTO.  As a result 
of this limited goal, this paper does not address the intricacies that drawing up 
appropriate regulations for such a labeling scheme would require.  However, even in 
absence of the exact criteria that such a scheme would be based on, this Section will 
focus on general strategies for such a label and articulate the main goals that should 
underlie any human rights label.  For the sake of clarity, this discussion will openly admit 
that such a labeling scheme will be based on non-product related processes and 
production methods (npr-PPMs), thus the label will focus on how a product is made, not 
the characteristics of the product itself—a distinction which will become important in the 
debate over the legality of such labels.62   
 
As articulated earlier, the only existing human rights labeling schemes in the United 
States are private schemes that suffer serious limitations in the areas of credibility, 
recognizability, enforcement, and consistency.  While some resistance to human rights 
labels is foreseeable from those within the government who want to keep regulation to a 
minimum, a government-run scheme is not a far leap considering that have already been 
involved in encouraging industries to develop their own standards.63  This paper will also 
avoid the more political questions of how to get such a proposal into legislative form and 
what the process of consultations and negotiations between the relevant stakeholders 
should be in the development of industry-specific standards.  The federal regulatory 
process required by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) meets any expectations of 
transparency through publication of draft regulations and providing opportunities for 
public participation.64  It is important that the agency charged with formulating such 
regulations pays careful attention to the successes and failures of exiting schemes and 
benefits from the expertise developed in the implementation of private labeling schemes. 
 
Steering clear of ancillary issues, it is still logical that the nature of the violations that 
such human-rights labels are seeking to address should be strategically considered in 
order to evoke maximum sympathy from consumers and leverage public relations 
support.  Commentators have noted that the most successful American eco-labels have 
often focused on “charismatic marine creatures.”65 In the same way, labels that focus on 
particularly egregious working conditions for traditionally exploited groups like women 
and children are likely to be more effective.  Consumers rallied behind the image of 
dolphins being drowned by purse seine nets and refused to purchase tuna that was not 
                                                 
61 This idea is not entirely new as Belgium adopted a social label in 2002, see Bruno 
Melchmans, General Labour Federation of Belgium, Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Belgium’s Social Label, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actrav/publ/130/7.pdf. 
62 See infra Section IV(A). 
63 See infra Section III(B). 
64 5 U.S.C. 511-599. 
65 Stanford E. Gaines, Processes and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy 
for Environmental PPM-based Trade Measures, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 383, 384 
(2002). 
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“dolphin safe,” so it is likely that images of child slaves or sweatshop workers will 
invoke similar sentiments in the American market.   
 
In order to fulfill legality requirements that will be discussed later in the paper, the United 
States should base a labeling scheme on existing international human rights standards that 
are as widely accepted as possible.66  For example, it makes sense to use the International 
Labor Organization’s Conventions (ILO) regarding child labor as the basis for a label 
advocating “child labor/slavery-free” products.67  Again, it may make sense to take an 
incremental approach and start by focusing on the most widely accepted abuses in the 
most sensitive industries.  The only existing government run human rights label, the 
Belgian social label, provides a useful example of relying on international standards.68 
These labels are based on the eight ILO “core standards,” which enshrine the basic rights 
and principles of international labor rights.69 
 
Beyond strategy and purely legal considerations, it is useful to identify the main goals of 
a human rights labeling system and articulate how the proposed scheme can best 
accomplish them.  The policy goals of countries with voluntary eco-labels offer useful 
guidance as to what the important features of a labeling system should be.  OECD 
members have identified five main goals for their existing environmental labeling 
schemes: (1) improving the sales or image of a labeled product; (2) raising the awareness 
of consumers; (3) providing accurate information; (4) directing manufacturers to account 
for the environmental impacts of their products; and (5) protecting the environment.70  
These goals can apply in the human rights context, by changing goal (4) to directing 
manufacturers to account for the human rights impacts associated with the production of 
their products and (5) to protecting human rights.  Attempting to accomplish these five 
                                                 
66 See infra Section IV(B). 
67 For a discussion on international child labor standards and interational enforcement of 
labor standards, see Timothy P. McElduff, Jr. and Jon Veiga, The Child Labor 
Deterrence Act of 1995: A Choice Between Hegemony and Hypocrisy, 11 ST. JOHN’S J.L. 
COMM. 581, 593-99 (1996). 
68 This label was adopted by law in February 2002 and was the first of its kind.  There is 
talk about the social label being adopted by all of Europe. Melchmans, supra note 61.  
69 The core standards consist of: Convention 29: Forced Labour Convention (1930); 
Convention 87: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention (1948); Convention 98: Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention (1949); Convention 100: Equal Remuneration Convention (1951); 
Convention 105: Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957); Convention 111: 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (1958); Convention 138: 
Minimum Age Convention (1973); Convention 182: Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention (1999).  However, the United States is not a party to all of these conventions, 
and is more likely to want to use standards based on its labor laws than ILO conventions.  
This tension would have to be resolved, and the criteria must at least be couched in the 
language of ILO conventions, even if the substantive standards are selectively taken from 
the conventions in a way that aligns them with U.S. labor laws. 
70 SALZMAN, supra note 50. 
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goals can inform the process of developing appropriate labels and also serves to 
demonstrate the relative superiority of a government scheme over the existing private 
initiatives.   
 
Improving the sales or image of a labeled product is an important first step because 
producers need an incentive to go through the certification process, as they are effectively 
betting that consumers will respond to the label.  The catch-22 of a voluntary labeling 
scheme is that a perfectly successful label would create a situation where products 
without the label are basically unmarketable, but this is the exact situation in which the 
scheme is vulnerable to challenge in the WTO as a non-tariff barrier to trade. A 
government label is more likely to be successful in this regard because a single label can 
be developed that bears the imprimatur of the U.S. government, rather than the array of 
labels from private organizations that are currently available.  This recognizability makes 
the label more likely to be effective at succeeding in this goal. 
 
Naturally, this first goal operates in combination with the second goal, as an informed 
and socially-motivated consumer is a necessary element to improve sales.  The label must 
be clear in the information that it is providing so that consumers understand the meaning 
that the label conveys.  The government is well situated to run appropriate educational 
campaigns and to focus national attention on human rights issues.  The success of the 
“dolphin-safe” tuna label is an important indication that the American consumer does pay 
attention to social issues while making routine purchases, at least when it comes to an 
inexpensive, substitutable product like tuna. Studies have shown that the American 
market has been responsive to private labeling schemes that promote human-rights issues. 
Research has indicated that a majority of American are willing to pay more for  “ethically 
produced goods,” with 68% reporting a willingness to pay more for a $20 sweater 
produced in a sweat shop-free environment and 75% reporting a willingness to pay at 
least 50 cents per pound more for “fair trade coffee.”71  This research seems to indicate 
that a well-executed government labeling scheme should have a fairly easy time meeting 
the first two goals, as the market has been shown to be responsive and consumers are 
already reacting to similar private labels. 
 
Goals number three and four (providing accurate information and directing manufacturers 
to account for the human rights impacts of their products) depend on the criteria used and 
the proper execution of such a scheme.  A balance must be struck between keeping 
administrative costs down and ensuring that the labeling scheme does not fall victim to 
opportunistic producers who are willing to misrepresent their production processes.  It is 
imperative that appropriate penalties are attached to knowing and willful 
misrepresentations to prevent the labeling scheme from acting to exacerbate existing 
informational problems.72  Providing accurate information will be a challenge regardless 
of who is running a labeling scheme, but the enforcement capability of the government 
                                                 
71 Shareen Hertel, Lyle Scruggs, C. Patrick Heidkamp, Human Rights and Public 
Opinion: From Attitudes to Action (Univ. of Conn. Economics Rights Working Paper 
Series, Paper No. 3, 2007). 
72 See infra Section III(A)(3). 
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increases the likelihood that producers are providing accurate information and are 
documenting their production processes.  In addition, a government standard is more 
likely to be viewed as credible and consistent by the public than private schemes offered 
through NGOs or industry.  Currently, even the most informed consumer may see a “fair 
trade” label and still not know (1) what “fair trade” actually means, (2) who is providing 
certification of the product as meeting this standard, and (3) what the criteria the 
certification is based on.  The government has the legitimacy to develop a label that 
people will see as credible, offer uniform standards, and not be overly influenced by 
industry.73 
 
The final goal of protecting human rights is the most important to keep in sight, as it can 
easily be lost amidst political wheeling and dealing.  While compromises will be required 
in order to formulate labeling criteria that is possible for producers to achieve but still 
incentivizes improvement, it is essential that the label not become a political or marketing 
tool that producers use to manipulate consumers.  The government’s role is to be an 
independent and objective certifier, and the government is the best situated to weight the 
competing concerns in the development of certification criteria.  The labels should not be 
co-opted by special interests and must be strategically designed to make progress on 
human rights priorities. 
 
The broader normative argument in favor of such a labeling scheme can be based on the 
idea that a well-executed scheme serves an important informational function.  The 
consumer “right to know” has become a rallying cry from consumers who care about how 
products are produced.  Arguably there is an element of consumer democracy at stake in 
which consumers feel entitled to “vote” with their buying habits and want to purchase 
more than just the product itself.74  Additionally, as it is a market-driven policy, it puts 
the choice in the hands of the consumers rather than allowing the government to mandate 
certain policies.75  This should allow for the market to respond appropriately to the 
demand from consumers for socially responsible products.  Perhaps equally importantly, 
it puts pressure on producers to compete with one another for public favor by racing to 
the top rather than the bottom.  Participating in labeling schemes is a way for 
corporations to distinguish themselves from their competitors, which has the effect of 
encouraging their competitors to do the same, which will encourage entire industries to 
account for the externalities caused by their production methods.  Beyond profit-based 
considerations, socially responsible labeling can assist in building brand equity, leveling 
                                                 
73 Industry-based standards and corporate codes are based on negotiations that take place 
between corporations.  Naturally, criticisms have arisen arguing that corporations water 
down standards so that they can claim to be operating in a socially responsible manner 
without necessarily making many changes to the way that they operate. 
74 Kyser, supra note 1, at 527. 
75 Beyond the fact that a command and control approach may not be preferable, it may 
not be possible, as most of the human rights abuses being targeted by the proposed labels 
are occurring outside of the jurisdiction of the United States.  The United States could not 
mandate that producers in other countries produce in a certain way, but they can use 
labels to incentivize certain types of production, regardless of where they occur. 
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the playing field between producers who are committed to fair labor practices and those 
who are not.76  It is particularly difficult for producers in highly competitive markets that 
do not encourage a lot of brand loyalty to make headway in keeping costs down while 
improving their production methods.77 
 
IV. The Legality of the Labeling Scheme Under the WTO Framework  
 
The element of the voluntary labeling scheme that sets it apart from many other proposed 
ways of linking trade and human rights is that this scheme is market-driven.  There are no 
direct restrictions on trade, so the labels can exist under the WTO system.  As mentioned 
earlier, the most important evidence that voluntary government-instituted labeling 
schemes are legal under the WTO is the fact that several already exist unchallenged in the 
eco-labeling context, and Belgium has already created such a social label.78  This section 
will utilize the existing WTO jurisprudence to evaluate the legality of the proposed 
human rights label.  Although this Part ultimately concludes that a voluntary labeling 
system is likely to survive a challenge at the WTO, care is taken to highlight the areas in 
which outstanding legal issues exist and where the labeling scheme would be most 
susceptible to a legal challenge. 
 
This Part will proceed in Section A by explaining the debate over whether or not product 
production methods (PPMs) that are not related to the nature of the product itself (npr-
PPMs) are covered by the specialized WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement)79 that covers packaging, marking and labeling requirements. Because 
there is no clear resolution of this question, this paper will consider both the possibility 
that the proposed scheme will be evaluated under the TBT Agreement and in the 
alternative, that it must withstand muster under the GATT.80  Section B will highlight the 
legal constraints imposed by the TBT Agreement specifically, beyond the basic 
requirements found in both the GATT and the TBT Agreement.   
 
Because of the wider universe of dispute resolution jurisprudence under the GATT, 
Section C will offer a more robust analysis of the legal tests implicated by a voluntary 
labeling scheme and their application.  As this section constitutes a lengthy analysis, it is 
organized by first walking through the GATT articles most directly relevant to the 
labeling scheme (Articles I and III), explaining why the marks of origin requirements do 
                                                 
76 Effects of Ecolabels: Assessment and Response, United Nations Environment 
Programme, available at www.unep.ch/etb/publications/Ecolabelpap141005f.pdf 
77 Micheletti, supra note 40, at 160-61. 
81 SALZMAN, supra note 50; Melchmans, supra note 61. 
79 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, [hereinafter TBT Agreement].  
80 For a discussion of the interaction between the GATT and TBT Agreement, see Joshi, 
supra note 33, at 79. 
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not apply to this scheme, considering the possibility for a “non-violation” complaint81 
against the labeling scheme, and finally explaining how the remedies available under the 
GATT do not give other Member States much incentive to challenge the proposed 
labeling scheme. Although Sections B and C conclude that a panel is unlikely to find a 
violation of either the TBT or GATT, Section D examines the possibility of affirmative 
defenses under Article XX of the GATT.82  The labeling scheme will be considered under 
each of the most relevant sub-paragraphs and under the introductory paragraph of Article 
XX.  However, it is important to note that no analysis can be complete until both the 
regulations for such a labeling scheme are formulated and the scheme is actually 
implemented, as most of the relevant tests are highly fact dependent.   
A. The role of non-product related product production methods (npr-
PPMs): an ongoing debate 
 
Much of the debate surrounding measures that take non-commercial considerations into 
account centers on the issue of whether it is appropriate to distinguish between “like 
products” because of the manner in which these products were produced.  The GATT 
refers to the concept of “like products” in connection with all of its most significant 
obligations.83  Thus, products that are produced in different or less socially responsible 
ways may still be considered “like products” within the meaning of the WTO 
agreements,84 so treating them differently may pose a problem.  
 
Because there are different types of PPMs, it is first necessary to identify how the 
distinction between products occurs.  Then, a label can be classified as being based on 
product related PPMs, npr-PPMs, or a life-cycle analysis (LCA).  Product related PPMs 
are based more on the nature of the product itself and are used to “assure the functionality 
of the product, or to safeguard the consumer who uses the product.”85  On the other hand, 
npr-PPMs are not inherently based on the product itself, but rather connected to some 
                                                 
81 A “non-violation” complaint is based on Article XXIII, and allows Member States to 
argue that their benefits under the General Agreement have been “nullified or impaired” 
by a measure, even if the challenged measure does not actually breach any of the 
provisions of the GATT.  GATT, supra note 26, art. XXIII. 
82 Article XX offers general exceptions from the requirements of the GATT, giving States 
the option to argue that the particular measure fits within the category of policies that is 
eligible for such an exemption. 
83 The term “like product” is mentioned in Article I (MFN), Article II (schedule of 
concessions), Article III (national treatment), Article IX (marks of origin), and Article XI 
(general elimination of quantitative restriction) for example.  These constitute the most 
important obligations that states parties to the WTO have entered into. 
84 The term “like products” does not necessarily mean the same thing each time that it is 
used, and panels have engaged in treaty interpretation to discern the meaning of this 
phrase in different locations of the GATT. 
85 Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the 
Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 59, 65 (2002).  Charnovitz offers food safety based 
on “process-based sanitary rules” as an example of such product related PPMs. 
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broader social goal that is implicated in the production of the product.86  Since this human 
rights labeling scheme would operate under the assumption that there is no discernable 
difference between products produced under socially responsible conditions and those 
that were not, it fits into the category of being based on an npr-PPM. 
 
Whether or not npr-PPMs are covered by the TBT Agreements is an issue that has been 
hotly debated by commentators on both sides of the issue.87  The language of the TBT 
Agreement does not seem to preclude the inclusion of npr-PPMs under the agreement, 
and textual arguments have been made that the structure of the definitions of regulation 
and standard imply that npr-PPMs fall within their scope.88  However, the negotiating 
history of the TBT agreement implies that only product related PPMs fall within the 
purview of TBT, although the issue is far from settled.89   
 
If npr-PPMs such as this labeling scheme are not included within the specialized TBT 
Agreement, they will be considered under the GATT more generally.90  In order to 
provide for both possible alternatives, the below sections analyze the proposed labeling 
scheme under both the TBT Agreement and the GATT.  Because the general 
interpretative note that is associated with Annex IA of the Marrakech Agreement 
Agreements Establishing the WTO states that when there is conflict between a GATT 
provision and a provision of a specialized agreement, such as the TBT Agreement, the 
specialized agreement “shall prevail to the extent of the conflict,” it is logical to consider 
the proposed labeling scheme under the TBT Agreement first.91  
 
B. The voluntary label as a “standard” under the TBT Agreement 
 
                                                 
86 Id. (noting that the consumer may or may not care about the social goal targeted by the 
npr-PPM label). 
87 For a background on the debate and negotiating history of the TBT as it relates to the 
PPM issue, see Joshi, supra note 33, at 72-75. 
88 The word “related” appears only in the second sentence of each definition, which may 
indicate that this intentional omission in the first part of the sentence brings even npr-
PPMs under these definitions.  ARTHUR E. APPLETON, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING 
PROGRAMMES: INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW IMPLICATIONS (1997) 93 
89 Id. at 93, citing a telephone conversation with Richard Englin of the WTO Secretariat.  
See also, Joshi, supra note 33, at 74. 
90 Joshi, supra note 33, at 79. 
91 Id. at 73.  
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The TBT Agreement sets forth a framework for technical regulations92 and standards93 
from becoming additional trade barriers.  The suggested labeling scheme would fall 
under the definition of a standard rather than a regulation because compliance with the 
labeling scheme is not mandatory.  As a result, the labeling scheme would not be subject 
to the strict requirements of TBT Articles 2 and 3, which contain antidiscrimination 
provisions and notification requirements.  Standards must conform instead with the 
much-lowered constraints of Article 4 and the associated Code of Good Practice in 
Annex 3.94  The requirements for a voluntary standard are less stringent than those 
required of a regulation, and as a result, it is more difficult to challenge a standard.  
However, even the Code of Good Practices contains a number of obligations that states 
need to meet in order to promulgate standards that are appropriate under international 
trade rules.95  These obligations should be followed when the designated agency is 
preparing a government-sponsored labeling scheme. 
 
The substantive provisions of the Code of Good Practice that must be followed align 
closely with the main obligations in the GATT: (1) the standardizing body must not treat 
products from one member state better than it treats like products originating in another 
member state or domestic products; (2) the standards must not be “prepared, adopted or 
applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade;” (3) where international standards exist they should be used; (4) 
standards should be created with an eye to achieving international harmonization; (5) the 
creation and maintenance of standards should be handled in a participatory and 
transparent manner that allows for input and cooperation with interested domestic and 
international stakeholders.96  As a result, most of these issues will be dealt with in depth 
                                                 
92 The TBT Agreement defines a technical regulation as, a “document which lays down 
product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the 
applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory.  It may also 
include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling 
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.” TBT Agreement, 
supra note 79.  
93 Annex 1 defines a standard as a “document approved by a recognized body, that 
provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for producers 
of related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.  It 
may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or 
labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method. Id. 
94 Id., art 4. 
95 For example, the Code of Good Practice requires that, “the standardizing body shall 
accord treatment to products originating in the territory of any other Member of the WTO 
no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like 
products originating in any other country,” and that “Where international standards exist 
or their completion is imminent, the standardizing body shall use them, or the relevant 
parts of them, as a basis for the standards it develops, except where such international 
standards or relevant parts would be ineffective or inappropriate, for instance, because of 
an insufficient level of protection….” Id. at Annex 3. 
96 Id. 
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in Section C, as there the similar GATT provisions have more case law to illuminate 
them, and the requirements are likely to be even more stringent in the GATT context.97 
 
The proposed labeling scheme should not encounter much difficulty in meeting these 
requirements.  The anti-discrimination requirement is inherent in the scheme, as it will 
label all products—regardless of country of origin— to be eligible for the label if they 
meet pre-determined criteria.  Although this paper does not advocate any particular 
criteria and recognizes that numerous elements would require consideration in the 
development of the labeling standard, using ILO conventions may serve as the best 
approximation of an international standard within the meaning of the Code of Good 
Practice. The ILO represents a solid multilateral effort that the United States has actively 
participated in to improve labor conditions worldwide.  The publication, participation, 
and transparency requirements would be satisfied by the APA required process for 
developing federal regulations that agencies are already required by law to follow. 
 
The most significant challenge that the proposed labeling scheme would have to 
overcome if it were being considered under the TBT Agreement is the requirement that 
the scheme not be an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.98  This argument is 
analogous to arguments that will be discussed later as part of the discussion under Article 
XX.99  This article will take up the debate about the term necessary100 in its analysis of 
the labeling scheme under the GATT.  Even at first glance, it is difficult to argue that 
other wildly successful labeling schemes such as the “dolphin safe” tuna label have not 
become at least somewhat of a trade barrier because consumers have expressed their 
preference for products with the label to such an extent that it is almost impossible for 
products without the label to be sold.101  However, labels like the one proposed are less of 
an obstacle to trade and more of an informative tool that allows consumers to know more 
about what they are buying.  Like any other specialization, this simply allows producers 
who are interested in catering to socially aware consumers to help their product stand out 
against the competition—no different than products produced organically, in certain 
places, or by a certain ethnic groups.  A determination of whether or not the labeling 
                                                 
97 Carlos Lopex-Hurtado, Social Labeling and WTO Law, 5 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 719, 
740-41 (2002) (“Voluntary social labeling schemes will not encounter more difficulties 
under the TBT Agreemet than the ones encountered under the GATT with respect to 
MFN and national treatment rules as well as to the requirement to avoid unnecessary 
obstacles to trade.  In fact, the obligations under the TBT Agreemet appear to be more 
lenient.”). 
98 Id. at Annex 3, para E. 
99 Infra Section IV(D)(4). 
100 Infra at Section IV(D). 
101 Environmental groups, such as Earth Island Institute, support movements to encourage 
stores to refuse to stock products without the “dolphin safe” label, and it has become rare 
to see tuna for sale without such a label, given the strong consumer preference in this 
area.  See Rigel Gregg, Not All Tunas Are Created Equal, That’s Fit: AOL Body (Aug. 8, 
2007), available at http://www.thatsfit.com/2007/08/08/not-all-canned-tunas-are-created-
equal/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2007). 
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scheme violates this requirement will also hinge on the interpretation of the word 
“unnecessary,” which has not been explored by a panel thus far.  However, the use of the 
negative form of the word “necessary” seems to indicate that the complaining party will 
have the burden of demonstrating that the label is not necessary to accomplish the stated 
policy goal.102   
 
C. The label as a GATT-friendly possibility: analysis of the label 
under the relevant GATT provisions 
 
One of the most important goals of the WTO trading system is that trade should occur 
without discrimination.103  In fact, commentators have identified the three most important 
principles underlying the GATT to be: most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, which 
requires that each party must grant the same treatment to any like product of another 
contracting party that it affords to any most-favored trading partner; national treatment, 
which requires that all imported goods and services be treated in the same way as those 
produced domestically; and transparency, which requires publication of measures 
regulating or impacting trade.104  The biggest hurdle for the proposed labeling scheme to 
overcome is to demonstrate that it is neither discriminatory on its face nor in its 
implementation, by complying with the principles of MFN and national treatment.  
Further, this labeling scheme cannot be a disguised barrier to trade, and it must be 
sufficiently transparent and fairly administered in order to increase predictability.  Given 
the limited jurisprudence of the WTO’s Appellate Body, many of the questions raised by 
labeling have not been litigated and answered in a sufficiently clear manner.  This 
Section aims to identify the most salient questions likely to be raised if the legality of a 
government-sponsored voluntary labeling program were challenged under the dispute 
settlement system of the World Trade Organization and to offer an analysis of the 
existing case law that a panel is likely to rely on if called upon to decide this issue. 
 
i. The label does not discriminate between trading partners: an 
examination of GATT’s most-favored-nation treatment requirements 
  
Article I of the 1994 GATT requires that any “advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating 
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”105  The issue of product 
likeness will be discussed in more detail in the context of the national treatment standard 
                                                 
102 The discussion in Part IV(D) will cover the meaning of the word “necessary” which is 
instructive for determining the meaning of unnecessary. 
103 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO (2007), Chapter 1, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap1_e.pdf. 
104 Dommen, Raising, supra note 15, at 11. 
105 GATT, supra note 26, art I. 
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in Article III,106 but unless npr-PPMs are considered to be a relevant basis to distinguish 
between otherwise alike products, it can be assumed that the labels are treating like 
products differently.107  
 
However, the fact that products with the same physical characteristics are being treated 
differently is not necessarily determinative of whether or not there has been a violation of 
Article I.  A violation would require that discrimination, either de jure or de facto, is 
occurring as a result of the labeling scheme.  In Canada—Autos, the Appellate Body 
recognized that Article I:1 applied even to measures that were origin-neutral on their 
face, if they were resulting in de facto discrimination.108  Thus, although the proposed 
labeling scheme allows all producers the option of applying for certification and 
subsequent use of the content-positive label, it could have a disparate impact on products 
from particular trading partners and be interpreted as de facto discrimination.  Given the 
focus on production methods that often occur in multiple steps in multiple countries, it is 
difficult to argue that a label awarded on the basis of clear and objective criteria is 
discriminatory.  In addition, because all producers are given the same opportunity to 
receive a label and all labels are based on the same criteria, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to argue that some trading partners are receiving advantages that others are not—
particularly because the label is voluntary and is based on the practices of the producer 
rather that its host member state. 
 
Although no WTO dispute settlement panel has faced the issue of a voluntary 
government-run labeling scheme, the GATT panel in U.S.—Tuna I issued an opinion on 
the voluntary “dolphin-safe” labeling scheme called the Dolphin Protection Consumer 
Information Act (DPCIA).109  Unlike the proposed labeling scheme in this case, the 
DPCIA contained a geographical element, in that it only required that vessels fishing in 
the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) prove that they had not used purse seine nets, 
exempting vessels fishing in other waters.110  Mexico challenged the DPCIA, arguing that 
the labeling requirements were inconsistent with Article I:1 because Mexico, due to its 
geographical location, was a country fishing in the ETP and was accordingly required to 
demonstrate that its fishing techniques met a certain standard in order to receive a label 
                                                 
106 Although it is not entirely clear that the concept of like products found in Article I is 
equivalent to the more fleshed out standard in Article III, the Panel in Indonesia—Autos 
indicated that the standard it used to determine product likeness in its consideration of 
Article III:2 was appropriate to justify a finding of product likeness within the meaning of 
Article I.  Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 
¶ 14.141, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998). 
107 If a panel decides that npr-PPMs are an appropriate basis to distinguish between 
products, products produced in a socially responsible manner and those that are not 
would not be considered “like products.”  
108 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry, ¶ 78, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (May 31, 2000) [hereinafter 
Canada—Autos]. 
109 16 U.S.C. 1385. 
110 U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 18, at ¶ 2.12. 
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given more freely to vessels fishing in other waters.111  However, even in the face of the 
label’s assignment being administered differently on the basis of geography, the Panel 
held that there was no violation of Article I:1, writing, 
 
According to the information presented to the Panel, the harvesting of tuna 
by intentionally encircling dolphins with purse-seine nets was practised 
only in the ETP because of the particular nature of the association between 
dolphins and tuna observed only in that area.  By imposing the 
requirement to provide evidence that this fishing technique had not been 
used in respect of tuna caught in the ETP the United States therefore did 
not discriminate against countries fishing in this area.  The Panel noted 
that, under United States customs law, the country of origin of fish was 
determined by the country of registry of the vessel that had caught the 
fish; the geographical area where the fish was caught was irrelevant for the 
determination of origin.  The labelling regulations governing tuna caught 
in the ETP thus applied to all countries whose vessels fished in this 
geographical area and thus did not distinguish between products 
originating in Mexico and products originating in other countries.112  
 
Although the Panel’s holding in U.S.—Tuna I carries with it no precedential weight113 
because it is an unadopted GATT Panel decision, it is instructive in its evaluation of a 
voluntary, government-instituted labeling system.  The Panel was clearly willing to allow 
a voluntary scheme, even if it was having a disparate impact on some Member States 
because the regulation was reasonable based on the scientific evidence available on 
dolphin behavior in that particular region.   
 
This holding would seem to indicate that a voluntary labeling scheme that is given 
economic force on the basis of consumer preference is not a violation of the principle of 
MFN.  This bodes well for the proposed labeling scheme.  However, the fact remains that 
“like products” from different states may be labeled differently on the basis of how they 
were produced and depending on whether or not their producers decide to seek the 
certification of the labeling scheme.  If a panel believes that the “like product” analysis of 
                                                 
111 Id. at ¶ 5.42. 
112 Id. 
113 The status of GATT panel decision in the WTO dispute settlement system remains 
unclear.  WTO panels have cited to GATT panel decisions, implying that these decisions 
remain influential.  In addition, the Marrakech Agreement establishing the WTO 
recognizes the importance of its inheritance from the GATT system in Article XVI: 1, 
which reads “[e]xcept as otherwise provided under this Agreement of the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary 
practices followed by the Contracting Parties to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in 
the framework of GATT 1947.” This Article can be read as an argument for giving 
GATT panel decisions more weight than they may otherwise be afforded. Marrakesh 
Agreement, supra note 27, preamble. 
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Article I114 should not distinguish between products on the basis of how they were 
produced and that a successful labeling scheme constituted discrimination against those 
Member States with lower human rights standards, it is possible that a violation could be 
found.  This seems relatively unlikely though, being that the same criteria would be 
applied to products originating in any country in the world—a uniform application which 
allowed the DPCIA to avoid causing a violation of MFN. 
 
ii. The label does not discriminate between domestic products and 
imported products: an examination of GATT’s national treatment 
requirements 
 
Article III of the GATT articulates the requirements for national treatment on internal 
taxation and regulation.  The general purpose underlying this principle is to prevent 
Member States from applying internal tax and regulations in a protectionist manner in an 
attempt to protect domestic production.115  The Appellate Body further maintained that 
the intention of the drafters was to ensure that like imported and domestic products will 
be treated the same once they have entered the internal market of a Member State.116  
However, the import of Article III is not to protect expectations of “any particular trade 
volume but rather of the equal competitive relationship between imported and domestic 
products.”117  
 
The subparagraph that most clearly applies to the proposed labeling scheme is III:4, 
which requires that imported products “be accorded treatment no less favorable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use.”118  Thus an analysis of the proposed labeling scheme under the broad 
objectives of this article requires that the domestic and imported products at issue are 
“like products” within the meaning of III:4, and that the treatment being afforded to the 
imported products is relatively less favorable than that given to its domestically produced 
counterparts.119  
 
                                                 
114 It is important to recognize that the U.S.—Tuna I panel did not believe that PPMs were 
an appropriate basis for distinguishing between products because the incidental taking of 
dolphins did not affect tuna as a product. U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 18, at ¶ 5.14; Kysar, 
supra note 1, at 543.  Notwithstanding this position, the Panel still did not believe that the 
labeling scheme violated Article I:1.  Thus even if like products are treated somewhat 
differently, there seems to be a minimum threshold of discrimination that a voluntary, 
content-positive labeling scheme does not seem to reach. 
115 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 16, WT/DS8/AB/R 
(Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan—Alcohol]. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 GATT, Article III:4.  
119 See EC—Asbestos, supra note 36, at ¶ 100. 
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As referenced earlier, one of the most significant issues being debated is whether or not 
GATT rules allow “like products” that have the same physical product characteristics but 
differ in terms of non-product related production methods can be treated differently.120  
When considering the issue of product likeness, the Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos 
recognized the importance of a case-by-case approach to making a determination of 
whether two products were “like” within the meaning of Article III:4.121  Although the 
Appellate Body recognized the usefulness of the four-part framework, which considers 
“(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products;  (ii) the end-uses of the products;  
(iii) consumers' tastes and habits—more comprehensively termed consumers' perceptions 
and behaviour—in respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff classification of the 
products,”122 it explicitly stated that this framework was simply a tool that was neither 
“treaty-mandated nor a closed list of criteria that will determine the legal characterization 
of products.”123  The Appellate Body ultimately concluded that whether or not this 
framework was adopted, the term “like products” within Article III:4 was concerned with 
the competitive relationships between and among products.124  The question of whether 
or not npr-PPMs can be taken into account in such an analysis, and perhaps allow a 
distinction between products which are otherwise “like products,” has not been answered 
conclusively by neither a WTO panel nor the Appellate Body. 
 
If a panel evaluating the proposed labeling scheme concludes the conditions under which 
the products have been produced is not a legitimate basis for distinguishing between 
them, relatively “less favorable” treatment will still have to be demonstrated in order for 
the proposed scheme to be a violation of Article III:4.125  As the Appellate Body held in 
EC—Asbestos, 
 
[E]ven if two products are "like", that does not mean that a measure is 
inconsistent with Article III:4.  A complaining Member must still 
establish that the measure accords to the group of "like" imported 
products "less favourable treatment" than it accords to the group of "like" 
domestic products.  The term "less favourable treatment" expresses the 
general principle, in Article III:1, that internal regulations "should not be 
applied ... so as to afford protection to domestic production".  If there is 
"less favourable treatment" of the group of "like" imported products, 
there is, conversely, "protection" of the group of "like" domestic 
products.  However, a Member may draw distinctions between products 
which have been found to be "like", without, for this reason alone, 
                                                 
120 For a discussion of the npr-PPM issue, see infra at Section IV(A). 
121 EC—Asbestos, supra note 36,at ¶ 101. 
122 Id. This framework has its origins in the Border Tax Adjustments report.  Report of the 
Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464 (adopted Dec. 2, 1970).  
123 EC—Asbestos, supra note 36,at ¶ 101. 
124 Id. at ¶ 103. 
125 EC—Asbestos, supra note 36, at ¶ 100. 
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according to the group of "like" imported products "less favourable 
treatment" than that accorded to the group of "like" domestic products.126 
 
While it seems relatively clear that affixing a content-positive label to certain products is 
a form of preferential treatment, the combination of the voluntary nature of this measure 
and its uniform application to all products regardless of origin make arguing that the 
labels amount to less favorable treatment for imported products a difficult sell.  Since the 
consumer makes the ultimate decision about how much weight to give such a label in 
their purchasing decisions, it is unclear if a voluntary labeling scheme rises to the level of 
discriminatory treatment under Article III:4.  All products, regardless of origin, are 
eligible for certification if their producers elect to submit the appropriate information.  
Thus, even though like products are being treated differently based on a label, it does not 
seem to rise to the level of “less favorable treatment” within the meaning of Article III(4). 
 
It is important to recognize that the voluntary nature of the labeling program does not 
serve to exempt it from scrutiny under Article III:4.  The Panel in Canada—Autos held, 
“Article III:4 applies not only to mandatory measures but also to conditions that an 
enterprise accepts in order to receive an advantage, including in cases where the 
advantage is in the form of a benefit with respect to the conditions of importation of a 
product.”127 However, the labeling scheme proposed is factually distinct from offering 
duty-free importation of qualifying products, as Canada did in the aforementioned case, 
because it does not translate into a direct price advantage to the favored product.  Instead, 
the only advantage offered by the label is providing consumers with credible reassurance 
that the labeled products were produced in a particular way—in effect lending the 
imprimatur of the federal government to back up the claim of responsible production.  It 
is less clear that this seal of approval is enough to qualify as the type of advantage that 
the Canada—Autos Panel was referring to.  However, the Panel emphasized that the key 
element is the modification of the conditions of competition between domestic and 
imported products, and the label, if extremely effective, may rise to this level.128 
 
The second necessary element of an Article III:4 violation is that the challenged measures 
results in relatively less favorable treatment for the imported product as compared to a 
like product produced domestically.  For the sake of argument, assume that the targeted 
product receiving the label is produced domestically and a like imported product has not 
undergone the certification process and thus has not received the content-positive label.  
In such a case, the question to be answered is whether or not there is “effective equality” 
of opportunities for imported products, as compared to domestic products.129  The 
Appellate Body further fleshed out this requirement in Korea—Beef, writing, 
                                                 
126 Id. 
127 Canada—Autos, supra note 108, at ¶ 10.73 (internal citations omitted).  This report 
was not subsequently reconsidered by the Appellate Body. 
128 Id. at ¶ 10.84-10.85. 
129 U.S.—Section 337, supra note 19, at ¶ 5.11; see also U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 18 
(arguing that there is no textual basis for requiring identical treatment of domestic and 
imported products, but rather “identity of treatment”). 
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A formal difference in treatment between imported and like domestic 
products is thus neither necessary, nor sufficient, to show a violation of 
Article III:4. Whether or not imported products are treated ‘less 
favourably’ than like domestic products should be assessed instead by 
examining whether a measure modifies the conditions of competition in 
the relevant market to the detriment of imported products.130 
 
Applying this standard to the proposed labeling scheme, a strong argument can be made 
that the uniform application of the certification criteria does not impact the competitive 
conditions between products, as all have the same opportunity to apply for certification.  
Although the higher labor standards in the developed world may result in easier 
compliance for domestic producers, it is difficult to argue that holding all products to the 
exact same standard is somehow protectionist and not preserving effective equality.  A 
strong counterargument is that providing consumers with additional credible information 
on the products they are purchasing has the effect of leveling the playing field, rather than 
creating an unfair advantage for some products. 
 
Ultimately, it is impossible to predict exactly where a WTO panel evaluating an Article 
III:4 will come down with respect to these two tests.  Much of the analysis hinges on 
whether or not the Panel is willing to consider the role of production methods in 
determining product likeness, and if they feel that the label disrupts the competitive 
conditions for the targeted product.  Since it requires a case-by-case evaluation, such 
determinations are likely to be highly fact specific and depend on the application and 
impact of the label—an impossible prediction to make at this point.  Article III:4 
represents the most significant potential violation of a provision of the GATT, but the 
built-in uniformity and non-mandatory character of the scheme make this of a far-less 
trade restrictive nature than any measures that have been identified in the past as national 
treatment violations.131 
 
iii. The label being proposed is not a mark of origin under Article IX 
 
The GATT also contains an article that relates specifically to marking requirements, 
Article IX, “Marks of Origin.”132  However, the GATT Panel’s decision in U.S.—Tuna I 
offered a clear decision that labels that are not based on product origin, such as the 
“dolphin-safe” label, are not properly evaluated under Article IX.  This Article is 
                                                 
130 Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, ¶ 137 (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter 
Korea—Beef]. 
131 See e.g., Canada—Autos, supra note 108; U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 18. 
132 The first subparagraph of Article IX reads, “1. Each contracting party shall accord to 
the products of the territories of other contracting parties treatment with regard to 
marking requirements no less favourable than the treatment accorded to like products of 
any third country.” GATT, supra note 26, art. IX:1. 
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intended to govern the making of imported products with the country of origin.  The 
U.S.—Tuna I Panel engaged in some basic treaty interpretation and reasoned that because 
Article IX:1 only contains an MFN requirement, rather than also requiring national 
treatment, it is not intended to cover the general marking of products, and only applied to 
labels based on the country of origin.133   
 
Thus, because the labeling scheme proposed by this paper is neither a mark of origin nor 
is it based on the policies of the country in which the product is produced, it is not subject 
to Article IX.  Human rights labels, like ecolabels, are not concerned with where a 
product is produced or the legal framework of the country in which is produced, but in 
the methods of production themselves.    
 
iv. The label does not give rise to a non-violation complaint 
 
Even if there is no direct violation of any provision of the GATT, the proposed labeling 
scheme could be challenged under Article XXIII, which provides measures against 
nullification and impairment of the benefits of the General Agreement.134  This Article 
allows for contracting parties to take action when they consider that “any benefit accruing 
to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the 
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded,” even if the measure 
being challenged is not a violation of any of the provisions of the GATT—a “non-
violation” complaint.135  It is conceivable that a party could argue that the labeling 
scheme is a de facto barrier to trade that either negatively impacts their products gaining 
access to the U.S. market or is contrary to the objectives of the GATT.136 
 
Although Article XXIII appears to be an appropriate grounds for a challenge of the 
proposed labeling scheme, past panels have chosen to interpret Article XXIII narrowly.137  
The GATT panel in EC—Oilseed stated their view that Article XXIII:1(b) was intended 
                                                 
133 U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 18, at ¶ 5.41. 
134 GATT, supra note 26, art. XXIII.  
135 Id., art. XXIII:1(b). 
136 Article XXIII was intended to prevent Member States from taking actions to avoid 
reaching their bound tariff rates, which would undermine the concessions that had been 
negotiated for.  Jean Monnet Center, Evolution of Non-Violation Cases, available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/98/98-9--I.html.  Thus, a measure that 
directly interferes with another Member States expected benefits by undermining a bound 
tariff rate is much more likely to give rise to a non-violation complaint than a measure 
like the proposed labeling scheme. 
137 Cf. Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling Programs and the GATT/WTO Regime, 
11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 599, 627-28 (1999) (discussing the applicability of Article 
XXIII to voluntary environmental labeling programs). 
35 
to protect tariff concessions, rather than to be used as a type of catch-all.138  This reading 
is strengthened by the fact that all successful nullification claims concerned Article II 
tariff concessions.139  The WTO panel in Japan--Photo Film set forth three elements that 
a member must demonstrate in order to raise a successful claim under Article XXIII:1(b): 
(1) there must be a measure that was applied by another member; (2) there must be a 
benefit that was accruing under the GATT; and (3) this benefit must be nullified or 
impaired as a result of the measure taken.140  Because the government would administer 
the labeling scheme, it would likely meet the first requirement, even though it is of a 
voluntary nature.141  Past GATT panels have held that a “legitimate expectation of 
improved market-access opportunities arising out of relevant tariff concessions as a 
benefit accruing under the GATT.”142 Thus there must be a cognizable injury which is 
occurring as a result of the proposed labeling scheme would have to occur with respect to 
a product that had been given market access opportunities through Article II tariff 
concessions.143  Such an injury could not have been foreseen at the time of the 
negotiation of the Uruguay Round negotiations, which may not be hard to establish 
because there were no government sponsored human rights labeling schemes in existence 
during the negotiations, although there were comparable eco-labeling schemes.   
 
However, even if these initial nullification factors are met, the challenging state would 
have to demonstrate that the program “adversely affected the relative positions of 
domestic and foreign competitors,” which is unlikely considering that any labeling 
scheme would be applied to domestic and foreign producers.144  This is likely the most 
important consideration with respect to any analysis undertaken under Article XXIII, 
since it is difficult to argue that an Article II concession is impaired under a scheme that 
does not violate the GATT’s national treatment provisions because of consistent 
application to foreign and domestic producers.  Further, since the most important target 
of a voluntary labeling scheme is likely to be U.S. corporations which are operating 
abroad and are sensitive to the pressures of the U.S. market, the labeling standard is most 
likely to impact multinational corporations that are manufacturing overseas rather than 
targeting raw goods from foreign-based producers. 
                                                 
138 Report of the Panel, European Economic Community-Payments and Subsidies Paid to 
Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (1991). 
139 Okubo, supra note 137, at 628. 
140 Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film & Paper, 
WT/DS44/R, ¶ 10.41 [hereinafter Japan-Photo Film].  
141 Id. at ¶ 10.43 (considering that a measure within the meaning of Article XXIII 
includes governmental actions short of legally enforceable enactments); see also Okubo, 
supra note 137, at 629-30 (analyzing eco-labels under Article XXIII). 
142 Okubo, supra note 137, at 629, citing GATT Panel Report on Japan: trade in Semi-
conductors, May 4, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th  Supp.) at 116 (1988); EC-Oilseeds, at 
86; GATT Panel Report on United States: Agricultural Waiver, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT 
B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 288.   




v. Remedies: Why challenging the labeling scheme in the WTO 
may not be in the strategic interest of the stakeholders 
 
Because the WTO’s dispute resolution system does not provide compensation for injuries 
that have already occurred as a result of the offending measure there is less of an 
incentive for a developing country to want to challenge the proposed labeling scheme.  
Instead, when a violation of the WTO system is found under international trade rules, the 
preferred solution is removal of the offending measure.145  Bringing a challenge is 
expensive and time-consuming.  Unless the damage done to a particular Member State’s 
exports is significant enough to justify investing in bringing such a dispute and the claim 
seems as thought it is likely to be successful on the merits, it is difficult to see how 
challenging the claim before the WTO makes sense strategically.  Currently, no voluntary 
eco-labeling system (except the DPCIA as part of a larger scheme involving embargos) 
has been challenged in the WTO, despite their wide proliferation.  Further, Belgium’s 
government-run, voluntary social labeling system has not been challenged, and it has 
existed since 2002.146 
 
It is imaginable that a successful lobby on behalf of producers could convince a Member 
State to request consultations under the DSU, but this could prove to be an extremely 
risky public relations move, as consumers may react adversely if such efforts were made 
public.147  Unless all producers of a product were willing to collude and join together 
against the labeling scheme, those who publicly opposed it would appear to support 
questionable human rights practices—thus it would be better to simply refuse to apply for 
certification.  This creates a type of prisoner’s dilemma in which all producers would be 
better off (in terms of keeping production costs down) if none elected to be certified, but 
any defectors receive significant advantages over those who do not participate.  
Additionally, it can be assumed that some producers are willing to improve their 
production practices or are already producing in a socially responsible manner.  Again, 
this simply rewards those producers and makes any public or legal efforts to undermine 
the labeling system appear in the worst possible light to consumers.  The only real 
argument that a producer who does not want to suffer reputational harm can make is that 
                                                 
145 William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 17 (2005) 
146 Clean Clothes Campaign, Belgian Social Label, available at 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/belgium_label.htm(last visited Mar. 30, 2008); 
Melchmans, supra note 61   The official French language cite for the label is available 
online at http://www.social-label.be. 
147 See generally, John. J. Emslie, Labeling Programs as a Reasonably Available Least 
Restrictive Trade Measure Under Article XX’s Nexus Requirement, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
485, 504  (2005) (recognizing that there is an unbalanced level of bargaining power 
between producers and supporters of a labeling regime as producers are likely to fear 
initial costs and the somewhat unpredictable consequences of labels). 
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the relevant regulations or their implementation are flawed—which gives incentive for 
improvement rather than entirely scrapping the labeling scheme. 
 
D. Exempt from GATT requirements?  An analysis of the proposal as 
an Article XX exemption 
 
While the GATT significantly restricts what Member States can and cannot do in terms 
of regulating in areas that have an impact on international trade, Article XX provides that 
the General Agreement will not prevent the adoption and enforcement of a limited scope 
of qualified measures.148 The inclusion of enumerated exceptions to the GATT rules 
indicates that the drafters were at least aware of the potential clash between international 
trade rules and non-economic public values, such as human rights considerations or 
environmental conservation.149  However, GATT and WTO panels have construed 
Article XX “so restrictively as to almost read it out of text,”150 further increasing the gulf 
between non-commercial issues and the international trade regime.  Arguments have been 
that trade restrictions based on human and labor rights concerns both should and should 
not be justified under Article XX exceptions.151 However, it is clear that a linkage exists 
between trade and human rights, as increased globalization has led to a demonstrable 
“race to the bottom” and the international trade regime has narrowed the policy space in 
which a state can legislate in order to act on human rights concerns.  Article XX may 
provide a reasonable alternative to justify limited measures, such as the labeling scheme 
proposed in this article. 
 
Although the previous section argued that an appropriately tailored labeling scheme is 
reasonably likely to survive the scrutiny of a WTO panel, if a violation was found, it is 
possible that the proposed labeling scheme would qualify as an Article XX exception.  
Existing GATT/WTO jurisprudence provides significant support for such a justification.  
The labeling scheme could be justified under Article XX(a), XX(b), or possibly XX(d), 
depending on how narrowly a Panel chooses to interpret the language of these exceptions. 
Subparagraph (a) allows an exception for measures that are “necessary to protect public 
morals;”152 (b) for measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health;”153 and (d) for measures “necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating 
to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of 
                                                 
148 GATT, supra note 26, art. XX.  For a general overview of how Article XX can be 
used to exempt measures aimed at improving human rights, see Salman Bal, 
International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting Article XX of 
the GATT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 62 (2001). 
149 Howse, supra note 14, at 2. 
150 Id. 
151 Compare id. with Tatiana Eres, Note,  The Limits of GATT Article XX: A Back Door 
for Human Rights?, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L 597 (2004). 
152 GATT, supra note 26, art. XX(a). 
153 Id. at art. XX(b). 
38 
Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the 
prevention of deceptive practices.”154  
 
Existing WTO jurisprudence has developed a two-part test for deciding whether 
measures should be exempted under Article XX.  A panel first considers whether the 
labeling scheme is provisionally justified under any of the substantive language in the 
enumerated subparagraphs, and evaluates the measure’s compliance with the Article XX 
chapeau—the Article XX introductory paragraph containing the general requirements 
that all exceptions must meet.155  Thus the proposed labeling scheme must first fit under 
one of the categories listed in (a), (b), or (d), and then meet the additional qualifications 
of the chapeau in order to be granted an exemption.  Consistent with this sequential 
evaluation, the paper will proceed by evaluating the proposed labeling scheme under 
subparagraphs (b), (a), and (d) and then consider its likelihood of overcoming the legal 
hurdles associated with the chapeau.  The scheme must only qualify for ONE of the sub-
paragraphs, but it MUST meet the requirements of the chapeau.   
 
i. The basics of qualifying under the enumerated subparagraphs 
 
Any trade restrictive measure being justified under subparagraphs (a), (b), or (d) must 
meet two requirements: (1) the measure must fall within the policy objective enumerated 
in the subparagraph,156 and (2) the measure must meet a “necessity test.”157  Some 
commentators suggest a third element should be utilized—if the measure is a proportional 
response to the circumstances and the nature of the problem being faced.158 However, it is 
again important to note that this two-prong test has been applied in the face of measures 
that restrict trade, such as the embargo used under the Marine Mammals Protection Act in 
the two U.S.—Tuna cases or the ban on asbestos in the EC-Asbestos dispute.  Because a 
labeling scheme is NOT a trade restrictive measure, it is uncertain whether or not the 
same reasoning would be applied or if a less demanding test would be created for this 
                                                 
154 Id. at art. XX (d). 
155 U.S.—Shrimp I, supra note 18; U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 18, at 22. 
156 This requirement is often described as requiring a sufficient “nexus” between the 
measure and the policy objective that it is supposed to achieve. Eres, supra note 151, at 
616. 
157 Eres, supra note 151, at 616. The word “necessary” is found all three paragraphs that 
are relevant to the proposed labeling scheme.  Distinct tests would be required for 
paragraph (j) which uses the word “essential”; paragraphs (c), (e) and (g) which contain 
“related to”; paragraph (f)’s use of “for the protection of” and “in pursuance of” (also 
used in paragraph (h)); and “involving” in paragraph (i).  See WTO Analytical Index: 
GATT 1994, ¶ 520, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_01_e.htm#genera
l. 
158 Christop T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International Economic 
Relations: The Public Morals of GATT’s Article XX(a) and “Conventional” Rules of 
Interpretation, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75, 96 (1998). 
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softer measure that simply provides information to consumers.  Based on the Panel’s 
acceptance of the “dolphin safe” label as being consistent with the GATT because the 
label did not relate to any market access conditionality,159 there is reason to suspect that 
panels may apply less stringent requirements to measures that are not coupled with a 
trade restriction. 
 
The following three sections will examine existing jurisprudence on each of the 
applicable subparagraphs.  There is necessarily some overlap in the analysis, as all three 
contain the word “necessary.”  However, this concept will be explored in depth in the 
context of Article XX(b), as the Appellate Body has ruled on the meaning of this term, 
hence the order of subparagraphs explored will be Article XX(a), XX(b), and XX(d) 
respectively. 
 
ii. Article XX(a): necessary to protect public morals 
 
At this point in time, no Member State has attempted to justify a trade restriction of any 
type under Article XX(a) of GATT, thus no panel has interpreted the meaning of the text 
in this subparagraph.160  However, the Appellate Body recently considered Article 
XIV(a) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which reads “necessary 
to protect public morals or to maintain public order” and its associated footnote reads, 
“The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society.”161  Given the 
similar language, the decision in U.S.—Gambling is instructive in terms of the way that it 
evaluated the necessity requirement and with regard to the definition of public morals.162 
 
The Panel offered a definition of “public morals” which was later affirmed by the 
Appellate Body, characterizing the meaning of this term as “standards of right and wrong 
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.”163  The Appellate Body 
then upheld the determination that the challenged measures aimed at preventing underage 
gambling and protecting pathological gamblers would qualify under this subparagraph—
                                                 
159 U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 18, at ¶ 5.42. 
160 Feddersen, supra note 158, at 96 (1998). 
161 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999), 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
162 U.S.—Gambling, supra note 19.  For academic analysis of this decision, see Albena P. 
Petrova, The WTO Internet Gambling Dispute as a Case of First Impression: How to 
Interpret Exceptions under GATS Article XIV(a) and How to Set the Trend for 
Implementation and Compliance in WTO Cases Involving “Public Morals” and “Public 
Order” Concerns?, RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 45 (2006); and Nicolas F. Diebold, The 
Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless Tiger and the 
Undermining Mole, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 43 (2008).  
163 U.S—Gambling, supra note 19, at ¶ 296 
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offering a useful example of the type of activities that can be situated under this 
exception.164  However, the lack of a “public order” element in Article XX(a) leaves its 
interpretation fairly open.  If it so to be invoked in a dispute, the Panel would most likely 
turn to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as the most appropriate way to 
interpret the meaning of this subparagraph.165 
 
Under the Vienna Convention, the interpretation of the text of a treaty should begin with 
the ordinary meaning of the text itself—in this case “public morals.”166  Unfortunately 
this term could lend itself to an endless range of potential interpretations, which some 
commentators have argued is likely to lead to a narrow interpretation of this term, as both 
civil and common law traditions interpret statutory exceptions narrowly.167  However, 
this is not certain, as the Vienna Convention contains no such rule of treaty interpretation, 
and nothing in the language of Article XX indicates that the intention of the drafters was 
to keep the enumerated exceptions as narrow as possible.  While the accepted definition 
of public morals includes those “rules and principles that both characterize conduct as 
right or wrong and stipulate the behavioral norms in that society,”168 which could offer an 
alternative to the U.S.—Gambling interpretation, this definition neither opens the door to 
a particular range of policies nor offers any clear limitations. 
 
It is questionable whether or not the definition of public morals could include measures 
taken to improve human rights practices.  In U.S.—Tuna I, Australia argued that Article 
XX(a) could “justify measures regarding inhumane treatment of animals, if such 
measures applied equally to domestic and foreign animal products.”169  Scholars have 
argued that if this view is accepted, it could easily be used to justify taking trade actions 
to improve treatment of human beings.170  Certainly a viable argument can be made that 
protecting vulnerable groups from exploitation is equally as important as protecting 
compulsive gamblers, particularly when the measure being employed is not trade 
restrictive.  However, the fact that the population that the labeling scheme is intended to 
protect is not limited to the citizens of the United States demonstrates that this measure is 
intended to have extraterritorial effects.171  The labels are also closely related to the 
policy goal that they are aimed at, as they are attempting to influence consumers to make 
purchasing decisions on the basis of how products were produced. 
 
In determining whether or not a measure is “necessary” within the meaning of Article 
XX(a), the Appellate Body in U.S.—Gambling endorsed its approach in the Korea—Beef 
                                                 
164 Id. at ¶ 298. 
165 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 23, 1969), 1144 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].  For an in-depth analysis of how Article XX(a) is likely 
to be interpreted under the Vienna Convention, see Petrova, supra note 162. 
166 Id. at Article 31(1); see also Feddersen, supra note 158, at 105-06 
167 Feddersen, supra note 158, at 95. 
168 Id. at 106, citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1008 (6th ed. 1990). 
169 U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 18, at ¶ 181.  
170 Bal, supra note 148, at 76-77. 
171 For a discussion of extraterritoriality, see infra Section IV(D)(6). 
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case, in which it employed a balancing test that considered (1) “the relative importance of 
the common interests or values that the law or regulation . . . is intended to protect;” (2) 
“the extent to which the measure contributes to the realization of the end pursued;” and 
(3) “the extent to which the [compliance] measure produces restrictive effects on 
international commerce.”172  The Appellate Body considered the requirement that no 
WTO-consistent alternative be reasonably available, and said that this standard should 
not be “deviated from lightly,” but that an “alternative measure may be found not to be 
"reasonably available" [. . .] where the responding Member is not capable of taking it, or 
where the measure imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive costs or 
substantial technical difficulties.”173  The Appellate Body also recognized that the 
alternative must still achieve the desired level of protection.174 
 
This necessity test, particularly when it is based on a weighing of the various factors, 
appears to tip in the favor of the proposed labeling scheme.  Protecting human rights is a 
goal that the international community has repeatedly identified and responded to, giving 
it legitimacy and demonstrating its relative importance.  The proposed labeling scheme 
does not offer a particularly high level of protection, but it contributes to allowing 
consumers to take action to purchase accordingly.  Finally, because of the voluntary 
nature of the program, it does not restrict international commerce on its face, thus it 
would be difficult to find a less-restrictive alternative which served the same 
informational function and so clearly related to the goal of improving the treatment of 
humans in the production of various products. 
 
iii. Article XX(b): necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health 
 
Currently only the measure in EC-Asbestos has managed to qualify as such an exception 
under Article XX(b), as Panels and the Appellate Body have chosen to narrowly interpret 
this exception.175  An analysis of the proposed labeling scheme under Article XX(b) is 
likely to rely on the three questions laid out by the GATT Panel in U.S.—Tuna II to 
determine whether the labeling scheme is necessary to protect human life and health.  
These questions are: “(1) did the policy fall within the range of policies to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health; (2) was the measure itself necessary to protect human, 
animal, or plant life and health; and (3) was the measure applied in a manner consistent 
with the Article XX chapeau?”176  The labeling scheme seems to fall solidly within a 
range of policies that are intended to protect human life and health, provided that the 
certification criteria targeted those human rights violations that were intimately connected 
                                                 
172 Korea—Beef, supra note 130, at ¶¶ 162-64. 
173 U.S.—Gambling, supra note 19, at ¶ 308. 
174 Id. 
175 EC—Asbestos, supra note 36. 
176 U.S.—Tuna II, supra note 18, at ¶ 5.29; see also U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 18, at ¶ 
6.20 (offering a substantively identical test).  Compliance with the Article XX chapeau 
will be discussed infra at Section IV(D)(5). 
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to health-related concerns.  Thus a certification scheme that required producers to 
demonstrate that their workers had not been exposed to dangerous pesticides is more 
likely to meet this standard than requiring producers to demonstrate that their workers 
had been paid a fair wage, for example. 
 
The Panel in U.S.—Tuna II used a definition of necessary articulated in Thai 
Cigarettes,177 which required that the measure chosen be the least inconsistent with other 
GATT provisions among all of the measures reasonably available.  However, as 
previously mentioned, the Appellate Body backed off this absolute position in evaluating 
the measure in EC—Asbestos under Article XX(b) by again recognizing that the 
importance of the policy goal must be taken into account as well as  the extent to which 
alternative measures allow the implementing state to realize its ultimate policy 
objective.178  Further, because this exception is available for the protection of plant and 
animal life, the fact that the measure is aimed at protecting humans elevates it in 
importance and may play a role in overcoming the necessity test. The evaluation of the 
labeling scheme under Article XX(b) will follow the same reasoning offered in the 
discussion of Article XX(a), except that it will require a nexus to preserving human life 
or health rather than protecting public morals. 
 
Ultimately, it is difficult to know how a particular panel will come down on the question 
of necessity.  The connection between the measure, which relies on consumer action and 
the human life it is aiming to protect—those harmed during the earlier production 
process—is more tenuous than a product that could harm the consumer directly.179  No 
panel has yet justified an Article XX(b) exception on the basis of protecting human, 
animal or plant life or health during the production process.  This does not foreclose the 
possibility of the label being exempted on the basis of Article XX(b), but there is no 
precedent for such a decision. 
 
iv. Article XX(d): necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the 
enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II 
and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and 
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices 
 
                                                 
177 Report of the Panel, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes, adopted on 7 Nov. 1990, DS10/R – 37S/200 (1990) [hereinafter Thai 
Cigarettes].  This report was adopted by the membership of the GATT, in contrast to the 
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178 EC—Asbestos, supra note 36, at ¶ 172. 
179 In the EC—Asbestos case, the measure was aimed at protecting domestic consumers 
from the harms associated with the product itself.  The proposed labeling scheme would 
instead aim at protecting the people associated with the production process from harms 
arising during the production phase. 
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The seminal case for the application of Article XX(d) is the Korea—Beef case, whose 
balancing test is described in the two previous sections.  Importantly, this test hinges on 
the idea that the challenged measure is being used to enforce another law.  The test that 
was articulated by the Appellate Body is comprised of two distinct steps,  
 
First, the measure must be one designed to 'secure compliance' with laws 
or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of 
the GATT 1994. Second, the measure must be 'necessary' to secure such 
compliance. A Member who invokes Article XX(d) as a justification has 
the burden of demonstrating that these two requirements are met.180 
 
This may be a more difficult test for the labeling scheme to pass than those required for 
provisional justification under Article XX(a) or (b), as the relationship between the 
labeling scheme and a particular law is necessarily dependent on how the labeling 
scheme is framed and its connection to securing compliance with another distinct law.  
Hypothetically, the United States could craft a voluntary labeling scheme to effectuate 
existing international human rights treaty commitments that were self-executing or that 
had been implemented through domestic legislation.  Further, the requirement that the 
original law is not inconsistent with the GATT adds another hurdle to cross. 
 
The Article XX(d) necessity test in Korea—Beef has been discussed above in the context 
of Article XX(a) and (b), and the same weighing/balancing approach would be 
undertaken.  However, in the absence of specifics in terms of how the proposed labeling 
system would interact to secure compliance with another law, any analysis on the likely 
outcome of such a balancing test is little more than conjecture.  If the law it is acting to 
effectuate is targeted at human rights, it is likely to be perceived as having a high level of 
importance, and again it is not a highly trade restrictive measure so it will have less of a 
distortionary effect on international commerce.  The real question that would be left to a 
panel would be the extent to which the labeling scheme secured compliance with 
whatever law it was being aimed at. 
 
An alternative argument under Article XX(d) can also be made—that the proliferation of 
numerous independent labeling schemes can be a deceptive practice that the government 
has to act to combat.  No panel has considered this type of argument, and thus there is no 
framework available on what type of test would be used to evaluate such a claim under 
XX(d).  It is noteworthy that the Australian submission in U.S.—Tuna I argued that an 
important purpose behind the “dolphin-safe” label was to protect consumers from false 
and deceptive labeling.181  Because the panel in this case did not find that DPCIA 
violated the GATT, it did not rule on the possibility of justifying such a scheme under 
Article XX(d), but clearly the Australian government was arguing that Article XX(d) 
could be a viable justification if there had been such a violation.    
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v. Step two: complying with the Article XX Chapeau182 
 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge for a voluntary, government instituted labeling 
scheme to overcome in order to qualify as an Article XX exception is meeting the 
requirements of the Article XX chapeau.  A challenging state could argue that such a 
labeling scheme constitutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination or is a disguised 
restriction on trade.  Such an argument would assume that the labeling standard is a de 
facto barrier to trade, particularly if consumer preference significantly limited the market 
for goods, which did not qualify for labels designating them socially responsible.  
 
The term “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination” appears in both the chapeau of 
Article XIV of GATS183 and in the chapeau of Article XX of GATT184 regarding general 
exceptions.  Both WTO panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted this language, 
and come to the conclusion that the chapeau’s wording in intended to prevent the abuse 
of the enumerated exceptions and requiring that reasonableness be employed.185  In a 
later report, the Appellate Body emphasized the balance that must be achieved between 
Members’ right to invoke Article XX exceptions and their duty to respect other 
Member’s rights under the treaty,186 foreshadowing their intention to interpret the 
chapeau as a strict standard to avoid the exceptions from encroaching much on the 
established GATT rules.  The Appellate Body further emphasized the connection 
between the chapeau and the general principle of good faith in recognition that when the 
assertion of an Article XX right "impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it 
must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably."187 
 
                                                 
182 The text of the Article XX chapeau reads,  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures.  
GATT, supra note 26, art XX. 
183 The Article XIV chapeau reads, “Subject to the requirement that such measures are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption 
or enforcement by any Member of measures.” GATS, supra note 161, art. XIV. 
184 The language with respect to “arbitrary and unjustifiable restrictions” is identical, thus 
it can be assumed that panels will utilize the same legal tests for this particular element . 
185 U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 18, at 22. 
186 U.S.—Shrimp I, supra note 18, at ¶ 156. 
187 WTO Analytical Index: GATT 1994, Article XX, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/, citing B. CHENG, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
(1953), Chapter 4. 
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The U.S.–Shrimp I case provides important insight into the way that the Appellate Body 
has interpreted the language within the Article XX chapeau, particularly the “arbitrary 
and unjustifiable discrimination” language.  The Appellate Body looked to two elements 
of the measure at issue in this case,188 (1) the “intended and actual coercive effect on 
other governments”189 and (2) the lack of “any inquiry into the appropriateness of the 
regulatory programme for the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries.”190  The 
Appellate Body has expressed their discomfort with the idea that the challenged measure 
in this case required that other governments adopt essentially the same policy as the 
United States, which counsels flexibility in policymaking.191  The main criticism of the 
United States in the U.S.—Shrimp I case was its use of a “single, rigid, and unbending 
requirement” that all other countries must meet in order to be allowed to import shrimps, 
holding that this rigidity constituted “arbitrary discrimination” within the meaning of the 
Article XX chapeau.192  
 
An argument that the labeling scheme is a disguised restriction on trade may have some 
resonance, particularly because the United States has also referred to labeling standards 
as possible de facto barriers to trade in other contexts.193  However, the United States will 
be able to maintain that the labeling standard would be applied in a manner that is 
uniform and is not discriminatory (as all producers, importers, distributors, or sellers 
must meet the same objective criteria to receive the applicable “socially responsible” 
label), has clear guidelines, and is completely voluntary.  The United States can argue 
that there is no discrimination inherent in labeling, and that these labels are intended 
solely to provide consumers with information rather than to serve as a trade restriction. 
 
Further, one of the most important strengths of the proposed labeling scheme is its 
flexible nature.  The measures taken to protect the environment in the U.S.—Tuna cases 
and in the U.S.—Shrimp cases were all mandatory certifications that imposed an embargo 
against goods that did not reach a particular standard.  The labeling scheme being 
proposed by this paper does not suffer from this same lack of flexibility, as flexibility is 
intrinsic in its voluntary nature.  Further, this paper recommends that the certification 
standards be developed in a way that takes into account the unique situations of the 
countries that production is occurring in order to avoid any indication that this labeling is 
aimed at coercing other Member States to change their policies.  Finally, because the 
                                                 
188 Section 609 in its application did not permit imports of shrimp harvested by 
commercial shrimp trawl vessels using Turtle EDs comparable in effectiveness to those 
required in the United States if those shrimp originated in waters of countries not certified 
under Section 609. 
189 U.S.—Shrimp I, supra note 18, at ¶ 161. 
190 Id. at ¶ 164. 
191 U.S.—Shrimp I, supra note 18, at ¶ 161. 
192 Id  at ¶ 177. 
193 For example, the U.S. Commercial Service’s report on France identifies the voluntary 
European Union eco-label as a possible de facto barrier to trade.  U.S. Commercial 
Service, France: Trade Regulations and Standards, available at 
http://www.buyusa.gov/france/en/116.html. 
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labeling scheme focuses on the product, rather than where it was produced, it is not 
discriminating against countries where the same conditions prevail, but rather employing 
a uniform standard across the board. 
 
However, a potential hang up for the United States in defending the labeling scheme 
under the chapeau may be their spotty participation in human rights treaties.194  
Fortunately, this should not undercut the legality of the scheme for several reasons: (1) 
the Appellate Body stressed the importance of negotiating an agreement only, regardless 
if such an agreement is concluded,195 and the United States has played an integral role in 
the negotiation of almost all international human rights agreements, (2) the United States 
has participated in the ILO and is party to several ILO conventions,196 and (3) there is no 
inter-governmental body that is currently negotiating standards in this area.  It may 
behoove the United States to make a formal statement that it is ready and willing to 
negotiate to improve human rights in product production and then avail itself on an equal 
basis and in good faith to other countries that are interested in negotiating international 
standards in this area.  Currently, United States can make a strong argument that the 
labeling scheme takes a value neutral stance in terms of the legal and regulatory 
environments employed in other jurisdictions and is relying on international standards to 
provide credible information to interested consumers.197  Additionally, the United States 
can counter that it is living up to ILO standards for its domestic producers and will be 
applying the label uniformly to all domestic and foreign produced products, so it is 
neither a violation of MFN or national treatment.198  Additionally there are no mandatory 
import restrictions, but instead any barriers to market access are based purely on 
consumer choice, rather than on governmentally imposed restrictions on market access.   
 
                                                 
194 For example, the United States is not a party to the International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention for the Rights of the Child, or the 
Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.  However, the United 
States has expressed a willingness to negotiate labor rights standards in the context of 
trade agreements, as evidenced by the NAALC and the labor provisions in other FTAs.   
195 U.S.—Shrimp II, supra note 36, at ¶ 134. 
196 The United States has ratified 14 of 187 ILO Conventions, including two of the earlier 
listed core labor standards: No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor and No. 182 on the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.  Department of Labor: Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs, ILAB Involvement in International Organizations, available 
at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/map/countries/ILO_int-org.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008). 
197 As argued earlier, the agency formulating the certification criteria should draw from 
international standards, for example ILO standards, as much as possible in order to 
maximize the chance that the labeling scheme could qualify for Article XX exemption. 
198 See e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19; The Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA), 29 U.S.C. §1801, et. Seq.; 
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act 29 USC § 651 et seq.; Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387. 
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vi. Exceptions allowable for measures with an extraterritorial 
impact? 
 
Another argument that could be litigated in the context of the chapeau is that all effective 
labeling schemes do have extrajurisdictional effects, even if they are not intended to 
coerce other Member States to alter their regulatory environments.  The argument is 
simply that because the United States has the power to set the standards required, foreign 
producers may forced be to meet this de facto standard in order to compete because of 
consumer expectations, doing an end-run around the governments with authority over the 
relevant jurisdictions.199 Scholars have argued that the standards used are likely to reflect 
domestic environmental priorities rather than international goals, and producers may be 
required to adjust their production processes accordingly to meet different and potentially 
expensive standards required by different markets.200 The developing world may argue 
that human rights standards in the form of labeling is unable to reflect the adjustments 
that they have already made to improve their human rights practices and does not 
adequately reflect their human rights priorities at home.201   
 
Considering the question of extraterritoriality requires an examination of the labeling 
scheme’s ultimate goal—who is the scheme aiming to protect and what goal is it seeking 
to accomplish?202  It is important to recognize that such a labeling scheme has both 
domestic and international effects, thus it is aiming to protect all human life regardless of 
national boundaries. Valuing all human life, regardless of nationality is certainly in 
accordance with the goals of international human rights law, and the GATT does not 
explicitly address the issue of extraterritoriality, instead the issue of extraterritoriality 
entered the analysis as part of the jurisprudence of GATT panels examining 
environmental embargos.203  In the same case, extraterritoriality was not raised as a 
problem when the “dolphin-safe” labeling scheme was analyzed.  Based on the text of the 
GATT, there is no explicit prohibition against providing consumers with information 
independent of any trade restrictions, particularly when all products are being treated the 
same. 
 
Because the goal of the labeling is to provide information, not to promote the kind of 
policy reform that was necessitated by the schemes in the Tuna and Shrimp cases.  
Allowing goods to be sold regardless of whether or not they have qualified for a socially 
responsible label ameliorates the concern of the GATT panel that, “each contracting party 
could unilaterally determine the conservation policies [or labor practices] from which 
                                                 
199 Okubo, supra note 137, at 609. 
200 Id. at 610 (noting that developing countries are particularly concerned about their 
inability to make adjustments to their production processes in order to avoid being 
excluded from the market, especially when they are selling in several markets that have 
different standards based on PPMs). 
201 See generally id. at 609-10 (articulating the issues that labels based on criteria 
reflecting domestic priorities and conditions may raise in the environmental context).  
202 Cleveland, supra note 12, at 233. 
203 See e.g., U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 18; U.S.—Shrimp I, supra note 18. 
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other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the 
General Agreement.”204  In U.S.—Shrimp I, the Panel held that parties could not act to 
coerce another contracting party into changing their domestic policies.205  Because the 
labeling standard is aimed at encouraging businesses, particularly MNCs, to change their 
production practices—something that would require no change in policy on the part of 
another contracting party—extraterritoriality is likely to be less of an issue.  The use of a 
content-positive voluntary label simply alerts consumers who are interested in using their 
purchasing power to support producers who are utilizing the best production methods—a 
market-based incentive for producers worldwide. While there ARE extraterritorial effects 
which may be viewed as an incursion on sovereignty, there are no direct coercive 
elements, only incentives for improvement. 
 
V. Avoiding Potential Pitfalls: Difficulties Associated with a “Social 
Labeling” Scheme  
 
Causes such as improving human rights tend to garner political support, particularly 
when taking up a cause such as eliminating child labor, and Congress has its willingness 
to take even more trade restrictive measures than a voluntary labeling scheme to 
accomplish human rights goals.206  However, because a well-functioning labeling scheme 
will have sweeping effects on the industries that produce the targeted goods, it is likely to 
face at least some political opposition from both sides—advocates that want a scheme to 
go farther and producers who want to keep the status quo.  This paper will address a few 
of the counterarguments that could arise in a political discussion over the proposed 
labeling scheme.  When possible, the paper will recommend strategies to avoid potential 
problems.  Although there is no perfect solution to harmonize trade and human rights, as 
this Part recognizes, the proposed labeling scheme strikes the appropriate balance to 
incentivize improvement in human rights without unduly restricting trade. 
A. Cost of implementation and administration 
  
Naturally lawmakers are likely to be concerned with the potential costs of such a labeling 
scheme.  Cost could be kept down by using a system of self-certification and random 
audits with appropriate penalties for misrepresentations, instead of attempting to inspect 
the production facilities of all producers seeking certification.  The United States already 
devotes significant resources to assisting industry in developing standards for themselves, 
so it is a small step to change the position of the government at these negotiations. It is 
disingenuous to pretend that there are not costs associated with certifying and labeling 
products, but compared to the possible benefits, this paper posits that the expenditures 
will be worthwhile because they allow the market to account for negative externalities. 
  
                                                 
204 U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 18, at ¶ 5.32. 
205 U.S.—Shrimp I, supra note 18, at ¶ 161. 
206 For a discussion of the more restrictive Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995, see 
McElduff, supra note 67. 
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The issue of preventing “sweat washing”207 may further raise costs as it becomes 
necessary to investigate claims of false information in order to maintain the credibility of 
the label.  A balance must be struck between ensuring a sufficiently high rate of detection 
and an appropriate punishment when a company is caught misrepresenting itself in order 
to deter such behavior.  While it is impossible that enforcement will be completely 
effective, it is important that consumers can purchase the labeled goods with confidence 
and know that the government is willing to stand behind such certifications. 
 
Another possible cost-raising factor could be the success of the labels.  If the labels have 
the desired effect of significantly improving the human rights situation in the production 
phases of targeted products, there may be a need to reflect the changing standards and 
higher demand for more labels for other products.  The government needs to be proactive 
enough to continue to encourage improvement and recognize that worldwide human 
rights standards are evolving and the criteria used may need to be adjusted to reflect such 
changes.  An appropriate notice and public comment procedure will be essential to 
adjusting labeling criteria, as experts and activists need to be heard alongside industry 
voices, and the government should strike a balance where its standards are achievable but 
do not set the bar too low. 
B. Possibility for inaccuracies in labels 
 
Realistically, it is impossible to create a labeling scheme that can guarantee that a 
product was produced in the manner represented by the label.  Labels actually signify 
that, to the best of the knowledge of the producer and certifier, the product was produced 
according to the criteria offered by the label—a far less attractive endorsement than a 
guarantee that the consumer can buy with absolute certainty that the product was 
produced in a particular manner.  Because of globalization, the production process and 
supply chains have become increasingly complicated.  As a result, the companies 
producing products are often unaware of exactly where and under what conditions their 
products have been produced.208   
 
However, private certifiers such as the Fair Labor Association have years of experience 
in dealing with and accounting for these challenges.209  The government certainly stands 
to benefit from the practices employed by the private sector and should highly value input 
from activists in this area.  An appropriately structured system of penalties can offer 
producers some flexibility for honest mistakes but still employ the idea of a multiplier 
effect, in which the likelihood of deviations not being detected is accounted for in the 
penalty.  Further, requiring documentation will give producers the incentive to regulate 
their supply chains and there is upward pressure, where multi-national corporations 
                                                 
207 “Sweat washing” and “green washing” are popular terms to describe the problem of 
producers claiming that their products were made in a sweat-shop-free environment or in 
an environmentally friendly manner, when the reality does not live up to those 
representations. 
208 Kuik, supra note 37, at 623. 
209 For more information on the FLA, see their webpage at www.fairlabor.org. 
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encourage all of their subsidiaries to improve their production practices, thus raising 
working conditions worldwide. 
  
C. Consumer disinterest 
 
The success of a human rights labeling scheme is necessarily dependent on the 
willingness of consumers to pay attention to such labels and to adjust their consumption 
decisions accordingly.  Although survey data has shown that consumers profess a 
willingness to pay more for ethically produced goods,210 and existing private labels have 
fared well on the market, it is always difficult to predict with 100% accuracy what the 
impact of a nation-wide labeling scheme will be.  Naturally, willingness to pay more for 
such goods is often based on ability to pay,211 and thus, as a strategic matter, it makes 
sense to focus informational campaigns on those consumers who are most likely to adjust 
their behavior.  Additionally, market research should be undertaken to identify those 
products which consumers are most likely to be willing to adjust their behavior in.  Just 
as negative public attention has the most impact on “logo” products,212 human rights 
labels are most likely to work in relatively low-cost goods in competitive industries 
without high levels of preexisting brand loyalty.  Further, educational campaigns can help 
to educate the public on the meaning of the labels and the abuses associated with 
production in extreme cases.  
 
D. Disadvantage to the developing world and small businesses 
 
One of the most significant criticisms that eco-labels have faced is that there is a risk of 
disadvantaging products from the developing countries that cannot afford the advanced 
technologies that are required to produce goods in a less environmentally damaging 
fashion.213  However, improving human and labor rights is often possible without 
significant investment in new technologies.  It is true, however, that providing better 
work conditions does raise production cost, which can erode the comparative advantage 
for countries with low labor costs.  Conceivably, a very successful label could be a type 
of entry barrier into the market, and it could also be a difficult hurdle for small and 
medium-sized enterprises.  This paper recommends that such labeling schemes focus on 
products that are generally produced largely by multinationals to the extent possible to 
assuage these problems.  The genius of this type of labeling program is that it is applied 
universally at the point of consumption, regardless of what the country of origin is, so 
there is no incentive for a corporation to move its operations to another country where 
there are lower human rights standards.  Thus, this scheme does not put pressure on 
                                                 
210 See Hertel, supra note 71. 
211 Id. 
212 Micheletti, supra note 40. 
213 APPLETON, supra note 88, at 20 (listing a number of concerns raised by voluntary eco-
labels). 
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developing countries to change their domestic laws and may even limit the incentive for 
countries to “race to the bottom” to encourage investment. 
 
In addition, voluntary labels do not suffer from the problem of collateral damage that 
sanctions are criticized for.214  The problem with “human rights” sanctions is that even 
the most carefully tailored sanctions are likely to hurt those in the most vulnerable 
economic positions. Instead of being a hard sanction, these labels simply provide 
incentives to reward producers for making socially responsible choices rather than acting 
to punish entire countries for perceived human rights abuses.  Workers benefit because 
their working conditions get better, but jobs through entire sectors are not lost they way 
that they may be through trade policies that are tantamount to boycotts. 
 
E. Retaliatory labels from other countries 
 
The possibility of retaliatory labels put in place in other markets could potentially 
damage the competitiveness of American-made products overseas.  However, 
considering that this paper encourages such labels to be based on international standards 
wherever possible as a basis for its criteria, it is less likely that this will be a problem 
because of international agreement around these standards.  Additionally the fact that the 
proposed labeling scheme is both content-positive and voluntary makes it less likely to 
result in retaliation.  The United States retains the right to challenge a labeling scheme 
instituted by another country that is unnecessarily discriminatory, but provided that a 
foreign labeling scheme follows the same general principles outlined in this paper, it is 
more likely that these labels will be mutually reinforcing rather than retaliatory.  If 
anything, such labels would level the playing field and give American-made products that 





Strict trade rules have limited governments’ ability to take effective action against poor 
human rights practices associated with the production of consumer goods.  This problem 
has been exacerbated by globalization which gives producers the incentive to “race to the 
bottom” to keep production costs to a minimum.  Traditional legislation has proven to be 
ineffective because of the cross-border nature of production, and the fact that the 
traditional political responsibility process breaks down because it “seems to only work 
well when government is mandated to enact strong laws that allow it to establish who is 
                                                 
214 See e.g., Joy Gordon, Economic Sanctions, Just War Doctrine, and the “Fearful 
Spectacle of the Civilian Dead,” available at http://www.crosscurrents.org/gordon.htm; 
Michael P. Malloy, Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: A Delicate Balance, The 
Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at Washington College of Law, 
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v3i1/malloy31.htm. 
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to blame for intentional wrongdoings concentrated in time and room.”215  Because not all 
countries are willing or able to pass and enforce strong laws to protect workers within 
their territorial jurisdiction, it is important that governments in the developed world are 
willing to act to take advantage of their market position and create market-based 
incentives for socially responsible behavior.   
 
Even if there was universal agreement about what standards producers should be held to 
and every country in the world had passed laws codifying these standards, developing 
countries would likely still lack the capability to prosecute transnational corporations for 
wrongdoings, even if they are willing to do so.216  Prosecution is additionally complicated 
by the fact that there are numerous actors, including some hidden actors, in the 
commodity chain for industries such as apparel.217  The labeling scheme proposed in this 
paper avoids these pitfalls associated with hard law by allowing developed countries to 
take actions within their own markets to voluntarily reward those companies who are 
willing to participate in a certification process, regardless of where the production is 
occurring.  Then the market failure caused by imperfect information is avoided, and 
consumers can reward socially responsible producers as they see fit. 
 
Because this standard is content-positive and focuses on incentives rather than punishing 
less responsible producers, it is much more difficult to challenge legally.  In addition, its 
voluntary nature and the fact that it is not attached to an embargo is further evidence that 
the choice is really in the hands of consumers.  It is difficult to argue, as a normative 
matter, that it is unfair to allow consumers to choose to reward producers for exceptional 
behavior.  The main differences between this proposed scheme and existing private labels 
are all positive: the labels can be used more broadly, they can be developed through a 
participatory process, penalties can be attached to deception, and the government can 
identify priority areas that the labels can focus on.   
 
Moving forward, it is essential to identify those products and industries that are the best 
suited for human rights labels.  While this article undertook the necessary legal analysis 
to demonstrate the legality of such a label under the United States international trade 
commitments, the heavy lifting of deciding how to establish appropriate criteria and how 
to best administer the certification process has been left to future scholarship and the 
political process.  Naturally, the practical development of such criteria is likely to be 
contentious and will require a significant commitment from the government.  If the 
premise of this article is accepted, that human rights labeling is a useful tool that does not 
violate international trade rules, then it is appropriate to consider how to operationalize 
this idea in the domestic context.   
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Ultimately, labels offer governments an important opportunity to accomplish 
international human rights goals while not violating their commitments under the WTO.  
Harnessing the power of consumer preference is an important step toward making human 
rights and trade mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive. 
 
 
 
